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1Summary
Sweden has traditionally pursued a restrictive policy on alcohol. One
of the fundamental and outstanding features of this policy is the
monopolization of the retail sales of alcoholic beverages. Spirits,
wine and beer with an alcohol content of more than 3.5 per cent by
volume may only be sold by the State-owned Systembolaget AB.
The products available in Systembolaget’s shops are selected and
purchased centrally, based on their price-quality ratio and a ‘blind
test’ carried out by Systembolaget’s tasters. The products that are
eventually purchased must then reach a certain sales volume during
an introductory period, failing which they will not be included in
Systembolaget’s basic assortment. Similarly, products that are
included in this assortment will be dropped if their sales fail to reach a
certain volume.
In 1997 the European Court of Justice had the opportunity to
pronounce on the compatibility of Systembolaget’s monopoly in the
so-called Franzén case. The owner of a food shop had unlawfully
sold wine in his shop and maintained that the statutory monopoly was
contrary to the Community rules on the free movement of goods. To
the surprise of most lawyers, the monopoly was upheld by the Court.
What was particularly surprising was the Court’s approach regarding
the applicability of Art. 28 EC. It held that Art. 31 EC was «specifically
applicable to the exercise, by a domestic monopoly, of its exclusive
rights1» and refused to examine the monopoly under Art. 28 EC. This
approach was totally at odds not only with the opinion of the
Advocate General, but also with the Court’s previous cas-law and
even with the judgements in the energy monopoly cases, which were
handed down on the very same day.
The Court’s judgement was far from convincing on a number of
points. First of all, the Court did not state whether Franzén marked a
general change of direction in its case-law concerning Art. 28 EC or
whether that Article would continue to be applicable to State
monopolies of a commercial character. To deny the applicability of
Art. 28 EC to State monopolies, however, would lead to the paradox
result that such monopolies are privileged over less harmful
obstacles to the free movement of goods. While Art. 28 EC prohibits
all kinds of quantitative restrictions, Art. 31 EC only forbids
discriminative measures. If, however, it was not the Court’s intention
to exclude the applicability of Art. 28 EC in general, the question
remains why it did not apply that Article to Systembolaget’s
                                                
1 Case C-189/95, para. 35.
2monopoly. Had an examination under Art. 28 EC taken place, the
Court would in all likelyhood have come to the conclusion that the
monopoly constituted a measure having equivalent effect to
quantitative restrictions and was therefore prohibited under
Community law. Moreover, the Court only examined whether the
rules governing Systembolaget’s monopoly were applied in a
discriminatory manner. If, what should have happened, it had
examined whether these rules excluded any possibility of
discrimination, the outcome of the case might well have been a
different one.
Some commentators have therefore seen Franzén as a mainly
politically motivated judgement. The judges, they argue, may have
been deeply split in their opinions and did not want to take a decision
against a Member State in such a sensitive political field without
having a clear majority. Franzén should therefore be interpreted as a
judgement based solely on its particular facts and circumstances and
does not prejudice the outcome of further legal actions against the
Swedish alcohol monopoly.
While the Court in Franzén focused its assessment on the free
movement rules, it is clear that other provisions of the Treaty may be
equally applicable to the monopoly. From a competition law
perspective, Art. 82 and 86 EC are of a particular relevance. As a
monopoly undertaking, Systembolaget clearly holds a dominant
position on the retail market for alcoholic beverages, which it may not
abuse. Moreover, the State may not create a situation in which
Systembolaget cannot avoid abusing this position. The main purpose
behind the Swedish alcohol monopoly is the limitation of the sales of
alcoholic beverages. This is to be achieved, inter alia, by the
limitation of the accessibility of such beverages. It is therefore not
Systembolaget’s purpose to satisfy the actual demand for alcoholic
beverages. On the contrary, the rules governing Systembolaget’s
activities are designed to render the access to such products more
difficult. In practice, this is achieved by limiting Systembolaget’s sales
network to 417 shops and 570 agents, through which alcoholic
beverages can be ordered. Several factors indicate that this sales
network is not apt to satisfy the actual demand for such products. By
reserving the retail sale of alcoholic beverages to Systembolaget and
by imposing restrictive rules on that company, th Swedish State has
therefore left Systembolaget in a position where it cannot avoid
abusing its dominant position.
In summary, it must be held that the Swedish statutory rules on the
retail sale of alcoholic beverages are contrary to both Art. 28 and 31
EC as well as Art. 86 in connection with Art. 82 EC.
3Preface
From a continental perspective, the monopolization of the retail sale
of alcoholic beverages is one of the more peculiar aspects of
Swedish legislation. For most people with a background outside the
nordic countries, the idea of having to take recourse to a very limited
network of State-owned stores is at least remarkable. This is why I
have chosen to take a closer look at how this system works in
practice and to examine whether it is compatible with Community law.
From a Swiss point of view, the outcome of this study is also
interesting with a view to the fate of existing Swiss monopolies in the
event of the country’s accession to the EU.
This thesis was written as part of the Master of European Affairs
programme at Lund University and as part of a research project for my
doctoral thesis at the University of Basel. I would like to express my
cordial thanks to all the persons who have supported me during this
programme and especially in my work for the present study. First of
all, I would like to thank my supervisor Peter Gjørtler for his valuable
suggestions and comments. My parents deserve my gratitude for
having taught me all the important things in life and for always having
let me make my own decisions. Special thanks go to my girlfriend
Karine for all her moral support and for always having been there for
me when I needed her. Finally, I would like to thank the Swiss
National Fund for Science and Research (Schweizerischer
Nationalfonds für Wissenschaft und Forschung) without the financial
support of which this study would not have been possible.
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6I. Introduction
The compatibility of Systembolaget’s (not ubiquitously popular)
monopoly with EC law has been questioned ever since Sweden
started its negotiations for an accession to the European Union. Much
to the surprise of many commentators, the ECJ upheld the monopoly
in its well-known Franzén judgement in 1997. This judgement,
however, did anything but end the discussions. Too many question
marks remained, too inconsistent was the Court’s approach with its
previous case-law. Moreover, the judgement only dealt with the
Treaty rules on the free movement of goods; competition law aspects
were left aside. The compatibility of the Swedish alcohol monopoly
with EC law therefore remains an open question.
After a short description of the historical background of the Swedish
policy on alcohol, an overview of the relevant Swedish legislation as
it is in force today is given in chapter three. Chapter four is dedicated
to a detailled discussion of the monopoly under various aspects of
Community law. The relationship between Art. 28 and 31 EC and the
compatibility of the monopoly with the Community rules on the free
movement of goods and competition are given particular
consideration in this chapter. In chapter five several alternatives are
suggested to the current Swedish alcohol policy. The conclusions
which are to be drawn from these discussions are summarized in
chapter six.
7II. Historical Background
1. The Years Before 1855
The abuse of alcohol is a far from new phenomenon - records of
excessive consumption of alcohol can already be found in Greek and
Roman mythologies. However, it was not before alcohol was
produced by means of destillation that it became a general social
problem.
Aqua vitae (distilled wine) was first imported into Sweden in 1467 as
an ingredient for gunpowder2. Very soon, however, it was discovered
that it could also be used as a beverage. Even though various
measures were taken to limit the consumption of alcohol the
popularity of aqua vitae as well as - in later years - spirits gained from
wheat and potatoes continued to increase3. By 1829 the annual
consumption of spirits had reached 46 litres per capita4.
2. Alcohol legislation from 1855 to 1994
In the early and mid-19th century alcohol abuse had become a
serious problem for the Swedish society. The reforms of the Decree
on Spirits (brännvinsförordning) and the Decree on Production
(tillverkningsförordning) in 1855 respectively 1860 pursued a twofold
strategy in order to address this problem: private profits generated
through the retail sale of alcohol should be eliminated and alcohol
should only be sold to consumers in a socially responsible way -
principles which still govern the Swedish legislation on alcohol
today5. Even though these reforms did not establish any monopolies,
many cities started to control the serving (and in later years also the
sale) of spirits through so-called systembolag (‘system companies’)6.
This model was introduced country-wide in 1905 and the
                                                
2 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/om/historia/xindex.htm (2002/04/15,
13:33h).
3 Ibidem. Measures included the ban of production and sale of distilled wine in the
city of Stockholm (1494), the prohibition of home production of spirits (1698;
repealed in 1787) and an import ban for most alcoholic drinks (1756). In 1590
Swedish soldiers learned how to use wheat as a basis for spirits in Russia and
in1746 it was discovered that spirits can also be gained from potatoes.
4 Ibidem.
5 BILLUM/GROTH/HAMMAR, p. 9; ERIKSSON, p. 3.
6 ERICSSON, p. 3. The most famous of these companies was the so-called
Göteborgssystemet, which took over the serving of spirits in Gothenburg; s.
BILLUM/GROTH/HAMMAR, p. 9.
8systembolag were put under the control of the State7. In 1917 the
production, import and wholesale trade of alcohol were monopolized
and put in the hands of the State-owned AB Vin & Spritcentralen8.
Between 1919 and 1955 the Swedish alcohol policy was
characterized by a detailled and comprehensive system of
restrictions9. The purchase of spirits was made subject to a licence
and limited to four litres per person and month10. Only persons with a
solid economy and conduct of life were granted a licence11. In its
strive to eliminate the negative effects of alcohol the State even
proposed a total prohibition of alcohol. A referendum which was held
on this question in 1922 was rejected by a majority of only 51 per
cent12.
Over time the licence system was used more and more as a means of
collective alcohol ransoning rather than individual control13. Its
opponents therefore argued that it had lost its justification and
proposals were made for a reform of the system14. The nykterhetsre-
form (‘sobriety reform’) of 1955 brought about a considerable libera-
lisation of the rules on the sale of alcohol. The leading principles of
the reform were individual freedom and responsibility15. The licence
system was abolished and a new monopoly undertaking,
Systembolaget AB, took over all retail sales of alcohol16.
Information and preventive measures as introduced by the sobriety
reform did not, however, have the effects its initiators had hoped for;
on the contrary, the sales of alcohol increased dramatically17. In order
to counteract this development a committee of experts (APU) was set
up, whose report, delivered in 1974, laid the basis for the modern
Swedish policy on alcohol18. Influenced by the so-called total
consumption model of the French demographer Sully Ledermann, it
proposed to aim for a reduction of the total consumption of alcohol
                                                
7 BILLUM/GROTH/HAMMAR, p. 9; http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/om/historia/
xindex.htm (2002/04/15, 13:33h).
8 ERIKSSON, p. 3; http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/om/historia/xindex.htm
(2002/04/15, 13:33h).
9 BILLUM/GROTH/ HAMMAR, p. 9.
10 Licences were called motbok. The serving of spirits in restaurants was only
allowed in connection with the consumption of a meal and subject to quantitative
restrictions; s. BILLUM/GROTH/ HAMMAR, p.10.
11 In practice an age-limit of 25 years was applied. Married women were not granted
a licence; s. BILLUM/GROTH/ HAMMAR, p.10.
12 BILLUM/GROTH/HAMMAR, p. 9; http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/om/
historia/xindex.htm (2002/04/15, 13:33h).
13 BILLUM/GROTH/ HAMMAR, p. 10.
14 Ibidem.
15 Ibidem; ERIKSSON, p. 3.
16 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/om/historia/xindex.htm (2002/04/15,
13:33h).
17 BILLUM/GROTH/ HAMMAR, p. 10; ERIKSSON, p. 3.
18 ERIKSSON, p. 3. SOU 1974:90-93; Proposition 1998/99:134, p. 32.
9instead of trying to turn as many people as possible into total
abstainers19. In 1977 the Parliament passed a number of bills which
were in line with the committee’s proposals20. The reduction of alcohol
consumption should be achieved by a combination of high taxation,
information, treatment, limitation of accessibility and the furthest
possible exclusion of private profits21. The new legislation provided,
inter alia, for an exlusive right of the State-owned V & S Vin och Sprit
AB to the wholesale trade with and the import and export of spirits,
wine and strong beer as well as the production and export of spirits22.
In addition to its retail monopoly rights, Systembolaget AB was
assigned the exclusive right to carry out all wholesale trade in
alcoholic beverages to restaurants. Furthermore, certain ways of
marketing such as radio, television and press advertising of alcoholic
beverages were prohibited23.
With the country’s accession to the EEA on January 1, 1994, the
principles of free movement contained in the EC Treaty as well as the
rules on competition became applicable to Sweden. However,
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden made a joint declaration,
stating that they regarded their alcohol monopolies to be compatible
with the agreement24. A contrary opinion to this position was not given
by the EC25.
3. Sweden’s accession to the EU
When Sweden negotiated about its accession to the EU, the
country’s legislation on alcohol got back on the agenda. In a cor-
respondence between the Commission and the Swedish govern-
ment26 the Commission took the position that various aspects of
Sweden’s legislation on alcohol were incompatible with EC law. In
particular, it demanded that the existing import-, export-, wholesale-
and production monopolies be abolished27. Initially, the Commission
also took a rather critical approach with respect to the retail
monopoly28. The availability of an ample selection of products in the
monopoly’s shops and the expertise of its staff, however, made the
                                                
19 Proposition 1998/99:134, p. 31.
20 Lagen (1977:293) om handel med drycker; lagen (1977:292) om tillverkning av
drycker, m.m.; lagen (1978:763) med vissa bestämmelser om maknadsföring av
alkoholdrycker.S. Proposition 1998/99:134, p. 32.
21 Proposition 1994/95:89, p. 48; ERIKSSON, p. 4; BILLUM/GROTH/HAMMAR, pp. 11-
12.
22 Ibidem.
23 ERIKSSON, p. 5.
24 ERIKSSON, p. 5.
25 Ibidem.
26 The content of this correspondence is summarized in proposition 1993/94:136, pp.
7-8.
27 S. Proposition 1993/94:136, p. 7.
28 «Guillou: En skymf mot kunderna», Aftonbladet of 2001/08/05.
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Commission change its mind29. It therefore declared that - subject to
future judgements of the ECJ and its own role as the guardian of the
Treaty - it did not see the need to take measures on its own initiative,
provided that all «effects discriminating between domestic goods and
goods imported from other Member States» be eliminated30.
Furthermore, the Commission declared that it wished to take part in a
close and regular supervision of the monopoly31. In the course of its
investigative talks with representatives of the Swedish government,
finally, the Commission stated that the selection of goods which were
to be sold in the shops of the monopoly had to satisfy the EU’s
requirements of objectivity and that new goods would have to be
made known to consumers in a better way32.
The results of these negotiations together with, amongst others, a
detailled opinion on the future of Sweden’s alcohol policy by the
alkoholpolitiska kommissionen (‘alcohol policy commission’)33 led to a
comprehensive reform of Sweden’s alcohol legislation. The details of
the legislation in force today will be discussed below34.
                                                
29 Ibidem.
30 S. Proposition 1993/94:136, p. 7.
31 Proposition 1993/94:136, p. 8.
32 Ibidem.
33 SOU 1994:24.
34 S. infra, III.
11
III. The Swedish Legislation
on Alcohol
1. Sources of Law
1.1. Law on Alcohol (alkohollagen)
The Law on Alcohol35 is the main source of the Swedish alcohol
legislation. It entered into force on January 1, 1995 as part of a
comprehensive reform of that legislation and replaced the Laws on
the Production of36 and Trade in Beverages37. As a result of a
correspondence and investigative talks between the Swedish
government and the Commission regarding Sweden’s accession to
the EU, the monopolies regarding the import, export and production of
and the wholesale in spirits, wine and strong beer were abolished38.
1.2. Other sources of law
The Law on Alcohol is supplemented by the Decree on Alcohol39. The
relationship between the Swedish State and Systembolaget AB as
well as detailled provisions regarding the activities of the latter are
laid down in an agreement, which has been published in the official
compilation of Swedish laws40. The Decree Concerning Instructions to
the Alcohol Assortment Board41 provides for the possibility of
suppliers to appeal to a special board decisions by which
Systembolaget AB refuses to include a certain product in its
assortment42. Finally, the taxation of alcoholic beverages and ethyl
alcohol is laid down in the Law on Alcohol Tax43, which is
supplemented by the Decree on Alcohol Tax44.
                                                
35 Alkohollag (1994:1738).
36 Lagen (1977:292) om tillverkning av drycker, m.m..
37 Lagen (1977:293) om handel med drycker.
38 BILLUM/GROTH/ HAMMAR, p. 16; ERIKSSON, p. 6; supra, II. 3.
39 Alkoholförordning (1994:2046).
40 Avtal mellan Systembolaget och staten (SFS 2001:852).
41 Förordning (1994:2048) med instruktion för Alkoholsortimentsnämnden.
42 BILLUM/GROTH/ HAMMAR, p. 17.
43 Lag (1994:1564) om alkoholskatt.
44 Förordning (1994:1614) om alkoholskatt.
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2. Definitions
The basic notions of the Swedish alcohol legislation are defined in
the opening provisions of the Law on Alcohol45. Some of these
definitions shall be briefly explained in the following.
Alcoholic beverage: Ch. 1 art. 3 of the Law on Alcohol defines an
alcoholic beverage as «a beverage which contains more than 2.25
per cent of alcohol by volume.»
Spirits: The Law on Alcohol distinguishes between spirit as a mere
ingredient of alcoholic beverages (sprit) and as an alcoholic
beverage as such (spritdryck). The former is defined as «a fluid which
contains alcohol in a concentration exceeding 2.25 per cent by
volume46» and which does not fall under the definitions of wine, beer
or strong beer47, the latter as an alcoholic beverage which contains
sprit48.
Wine: Ch. 1 art. 5 of the Law on Alcohol provides for a very wide
definition of wine. In principle, any beverage with an alcohol content
between 2.25 per cent and 22 per cent by volume is considered to be
wine unless it falls under the definition of spirits, strong beer or beer49.
Not only alcoholic beverages produced by means of fermentation of
grapes thus fall under the notion of wine but also madeira, port wine,
sherry and vermouth and even beverages produced from berries
other than grapes, fruit «or other parts of plants50».
Beer: In ch. 1 art. 6, para. 2 AL beer is defined as a «fermented,
undistilled beverage which is produced from dried or roasted malt
[...]» and whose alcohol content exceeds 2.25 but not 3.5 per cent by
volume. Beer with an alcohol content of more than 3.5 per cent by
volume is called «strong beer» (starköl)51.
The notions of producer, sale, retail sale, wholesale and serving  as
laid down in the Law on Alcohol52 do not differ from the general
understanding of these notions.
                                                
45 Ch. 1 AL.
46 Ch. 1 art. 2, para. 1, sentence 1 AL.
47 Ch. 1 art. 2, para. 1, sentence 3 AL.
48 Ch. 1 art. 4 AL.
49 BILLUM/GROTH/ HAMMAR, p. 24.
50 Ch. 1 art. 5 AL.
51 Ch. 1 art. 6, para. 1 AL.
52 Ch.1 art. 8 AL.
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3. Production
Under ch. 2 art. 1, para. 1 and ch. 2 art. 2 AL alcohol may only be
produced by holders of a manufacturing licence53. An application
charge of currently SEK 2,000.00 must be paid when the application
is submitted54. This charge is generally not reimbursed if the
application is rejected55. Holders of a manufacturing licence are
further required to pay an annual monitoring charge, the amount of
which varies according to the volume of production56.
4. Import and export
4.1. Commercial importation and exportation
Spirits, wine and strong beer may be imported and exported by any
person who has the right to carry out wholesale trade in alcohol57.
This right is in turn linked to an approval as a warehouse keeper by
the tax authority or registration as a consignee with the last-
mentioned58. With the fulfilment of either of these criteria - approval or
registration - the right to import and export spirits, wine and strong
beer thus automatically arises. Furthermore, Systembolaget AB may
on customer request import spirits, wine and strong beer which it
does not have in stock59.
4.2. Importation for personal use
According to Council Directive 92/12/EEC no taxes may be levied by
the State of importation on alcoholic beverages which are imported
from another Member State by private persons for their personal use60.
When determining the amounts of alcohol which are to be considered
as destined for personal use, Member States must not set the limits
below a cumulative minimum of 10 litres for spirits, 20 litres for
intermediate products, 90 litres for wine (of which up to 60 litres
sparkling wine) and 110 litres for beer61.
However, Sweden was granted a temporary exception in the Act of
Accession, which allowed it to provisionally maintain its lower limits
                                                
53 No licence is required, however, for the home production of wine, strong beer and
beer for personal consumption; s. ch. 2 art. 2 AL.
54 Ch. 7 art. 4 AL in combination with art. 10 and 17 AF.
55 Art. 21 AF e contrario.
56 Ch. 7 art. 4 AL in combination with art. 11-15 and 18 AF.
57 Ch. 4 art. 2, para. 1 and ch. 4 art. 5 AL; s. infra, III. 5.
58 Art. 9 and 12 LAS.
59 Ch. 4 art. 2, para. 1 in connection with ch. 5 art. 5 AL and art. 2 of the contract
between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish State (SFS 2001:852).
60 Art. 8 of Council Directive 92/12/EEC [1992] OJ L076/1 et seq.
61 Art. 9 (2) of Council Directive 92/12/EEC [1992] OJ L076/1 et seq.
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for private importation of alcohol62. Sweden and the Commission later
agreed that this exception should expire on December 31, 2003 and
that the limits for private importation of alcohol should be gradually
raised63. From January 1, 2002, the following amounts of alcohol may
be imported by private persons into Sweden from another Member
State without import taxes being levied: 2 litres of spirits, 3 litres of
intermediate products, 26 litres of wine and 32 litres of strong beer64.
On January 1, 2003, these limits will be raised to 5 litres for spirits, 52
litres for wine and 64 litres for strong beer and from January 1, 2004,
the minimum limits as laid down in Council Directive 92/12/EEC will
apply65.
5. Wholesale
Wholesale trade in alcohol may be carried out by any warehouse
keeper who is approved by and any consignee who is registered with
the Swedish tax authority66. In both cases the right to carry out
wholesale trade is limited to the goods mentioned in the approval or
registration67. Moreover, Systembolaget AB is entitled to sell spirits,
wine and strong beer by wholesale to restaurants and other holders
of a serving licence68.
Only traders with a registered office in Sweden can be approved as a
warehouse keeper or registered as a consignee69. Consequently,
traders registered in other Member States are precluded from
delivering alcoholic beverages to Swedish retailers unless they have
a registered office in Sweden.
                                                
62 Art. 71 (2) and Appendix IX Art. 3 of the Treaty on the accession of the Kingdom
of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of
Sweden to the European Union of June 24, 1994; Proposition 1994/95:19.
63 Proposition 1999/2000:121, p. 9; «EU:s regler införs stegvis», DN of 2000/04/19;
«Klart om de nya införselreglerna», SvD of 2000/04/19; «Gnadenfrist der EU für
Schwedens Alkoholpolitik», NZZ of 2000/04/19.
64 Art. 2 lag (1994:1565) om beskattning av viss privatinförsel.
65 Proposition 1999/2000:121, p. 9.
66 Ch. 4 art. 1, para. 1 AL; s. also supra, III. 4.1. Wholesale trade in alcohol may,
however, not be carried out by persons under the age of 20 or who are placed under
the care of a guardian; ch. 3 art. 7 AL.
67 Ch. 4 art. 1, para. 1 AL. Traders are obliged to ensure that sale of alcohol is
carried out in the least harmful way possible and that «order and sobriety prevail in
the place of sale»; ch. 3 art. 4 AL.
68 Ch. 4 art. 1, para. 2 in connection with ch. 5 art. 1, para. 3 AL.
69 Telephone conversation with Ann-Kristin Andersson at Särskilda Skattekontoret of
May 21, 2001. S. also Särskilda Skattekontoret’s information brochure SSK020122:
«Information till dig som ansöker om godkännande som upplagshavare eller
registrering som varumottagare avseende alkoholvaror», ch. 5 and 6.
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No charges are collected for such approval or registration70. However,
a security payment must be deposited in order to ensure the payment
of any taxes incurred71.
6. Retail Trade
6.1. General provisions
Ch. 3 AL contains a number of general provisions regarding the sale
of alcoholic beverages. These provisions are aimed at ensuring that
the sale of alcoholic beverages is carried out in a socially responsible
way.
Under ch. 3 art. 7 AL only persons aged 20 years or older who are not
placed under the care of a guardian are allowed to sell alcoholic
beverages. Sellers are obliged to ensure that the sale of alcohol is
carried out in the least harmful way possible and «that order and
sobriety prevail in the place of sale»72. Alcoholic beverages may not
be sold to persons «who are perceptibly affected by alcohol or any
other intoxicating substance» or if there are reasons to assume that
the beverages may unlawfully be made available to a third person73.
Moreover, a «satisfactory selection and amount» of non-alcoholic
drinks must be made available in the place of sale74.
6.2. Retail trade in low-alcoholic beer
Beer with an alcohol content of up to 3.5 per cent by volume may be
freely sold in any shop which is approved for the sale of foodstuffs75. A
licence is not required for the sale of such low-alcoholic beer;
however, the seller must notify the municipality on the territory of
which the place of sale is located76. In the year 2000 approximately
14’000 shops sold low-alcoholic beer77. The age-limit for the purchase
of low-alcoholic beer is 18 years78.
                                                
70 Telephone conversation with Ann-Kristin Andersson at Särskilda Skattekontoret of
May 21, 2001.
71 Art. 10 and 12, para. 2 LAS.
72 Ch. 3 art. 4.
73 Ch. 3 art. 8, para. 2 and 3 AL.
74 Ch. 3 art. 6 AL.
75 Ch. 5 art. 6, para. 1 AL and ch. 5 art. 2, para. 1 AL e contrario.
76 Ch. 5 art. 6, para. 2 AL.
77 Statens Folkhälsoinstitut at http://212.209.152.178/komhand/folkol/_index.asp
(2002/04/23, 09:53h).
78 Ch. 3 art. 8, para. 1 AL.
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6.3. Retail trade in other alcoholic beverages
6.3.1. The right to sell and to purchase alcoholic beverages
While the retail trade in low-alcoholic beer is open to competition79,
the right to sell spirits, wine and beer with an alcohol content
exceeding 3.5 per cent by volume to consumers is reserved to one
single actor. Retail trade in such beverages may be lawfully carried
out only by Systembolaget AB, a fully State-owned company80.
Alcoholic beverages other than low-alcoholic beer may only be sold
to persons aged 20 or older81. Salespersons are obliged to make sure
that the customer has reached this age82. Systembolaget has
instructed its salespersons to ask all customers who look younger
than 25 to produce a proof of identity83.
6.3.2. Systembolaget’s activities
6.3.2.1. In general
In the year 2001 Systembolaget sold 317.3 million litres of alcoholic
beverages, which corresponds to 33.6 million litres of pure alcohol or
4.7 litres of pure alcohol per inhabitant aged 15 or older84. It attained a
turnover of SEK 18.2 billion and a net profit of SEK 133.2 million85 and
employed an average of 3,400 persons86.
Systembolaget is set up as a limited company under Swedish law87.
Due to the fact that the activityit is exercising lies in th public interest
and has been assigned to it by the State, Systembolaget has a
number of special duties towards the Swedish State. These duties
are laid down in an agreement between the State and
Systembolaget88. In particular, this agreement obliges Systembolaget
to set its margins in accordance with objective criteria89 and to apply
unbiased and customary trading conditions90. Moreover,
                                                
79 S. supra, III. 6.2.
80 Ch. 5 art. 2 in connection with art. 1, para. 1 AL and art. 2 of the agreement
between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish State (SFS 2001:852).
81 Ch. 3 art. 8, para. 1 AL.
82 Ch. 3 art. 8, para. 4 AL.
83 Systembolaget’s annual report for 2000.
84 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/om/press/020116.html (2002/04/12, 14:35).
85 Systembolaget’s sales statistics for 2001, p. 15.
86 Systembolaget’s sales statistics for 2001, p. 20.
87 S. BILLUM/GROTH/ HAMMAR, p. 49.
88 Agreement between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish State (SFS 2001:852). In
addition to th obligations described hereafter, the agreement in its previous wording
imposed a number of social obligations on Systembolaget; s. BILLUM/GROTH/
HAMMAR, p. 49; ERIKSSON, pp. 7-8.
89 Art. 6 of the agreement between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish State (SFS
2001:852).
90 Art. 14, para. 2 of the agreement between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish
State (SFS 2001:852).
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Systembolaget is prohibited from acquiring shares in other
companies or to become otherwise involved in the activities of other
companies without the prior consent of the Swedish government91.
Finally, the agreement contains restrictions as to the establishment,
closure and operation of shops and the selection of articles, which
shall be described below92.
6.3.2.2. Shops and opening hours
Under art. 9, para. 1 of its agreement with the State93 Systembolaget is
in principle obliged to establish a shop in every municipality that so
wishes. On May 8, 2002, Systembolaget operated a total of 417
shops in nearly all of Sweden’s 289 municipalities94. This
corresponds to one shop per 21,374 inhabitants or one shop per
1,079 km2. Moreover, it has a network of agents, mostly located in
rural areas, with whom alcoholic beverages may be ordered without
extra cost95. On May 8, 2002, the number of these agents was
approximately 57096. In all of Systembolaget’s shops products
previously had to be ordered at the counter and were handed out to
customers by a salesperson. In recent years, however, an increasing
number of shops have been converted into self-service shops.
Systembolaget’s decisions to establish or close shops shall in
principle be influenced only by economic reasons and service
considerations97. However, the company is obliged to consult the
municipal council and the police before it decides to establish or
move a shop98. Likewise, the municipal council must be consulted
before a decision is made on the closure of a shop99.
Systembolaget is also prevented from freely deciding on the opening
hours of its shops. Under art. 11 of its agreement with the State, the
opening hours must be determined in accordance with guidelines that
                                                
91 Art. 3 i.f. of the agreement between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish State
(SFS 2001:852).
92 S. infra, III. 6.3.2.2. and III. 6.3.2.3.
93 Agreement between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish State (SFS 2001:852).
94 E-mail from Kajsa Riddersporre, market and communications department at
Systembolaget of May 8, 2002.
95 Art. 13 of the agreement between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish State (SFS
2001:852); Systembolaget’s annual report for 2000; ERIKSSON, p. 8.
96 E-mail from Kajsa Riddersporre, market and communications department at
Systembolaget of May 8, 2002.
97 Art. 9, para. 2 of the agreement between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish
State (SFS 2001:852).
98 Art. 10 i.i. of the agreement between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish State
(SFS 2001:852).
99 Art. 10 i.f. of the agreement between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish State
(SFS 2001:852). Art. 11 of the previous wording of the agreement imposed an
obligation on Systembolaget to locate its points of sale such as to avoid social
inconveniences as far as possible. This provision has been removed in the
agreement which is in force today; s. ERIKSSON, p. 8.
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have been adopted by the Parliament100. At present, these guidelines
allow Systembolaget to keep its shops open from 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on
weekdays and from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. on Saturdays101.
6.3.2.3. Assortment
6.3.2.3.1. Legal requirements
The size and quality of Systembolaget’s assortment as well as the
availability of a wide range of products even in smaller shops was
one of the main reasons why Sweden was allowed to keep its
monopoly on the retail sale of alcohol even after the country’s
accession to the EU102. In the course of its negotiations with the
Swedish government the Commission was quick to point out,
however, that Sweden would have to ensure that any discrimination
between Swedish goods and goods imported from other Member
States had to be eliminated103. Moreover, the selection of goods
available in Systembolaget’s shops would have to satisfy the EU’s
requirements of objectivity104. Finally, it demanded that new products
be made known to consumers in an effective way105. The agreement
between Systembolaget and the Swedish State therefore obliges
Systembolaget to select its products in a non-discriminatory manner
and to base its selection only on criteria of quality, health, customer
demand and business economy106. Furthermore, Systembolaget is
required to inform its customers of new products in an impartial and
non-discriminatory way107.
6.3.2.3.2. Assortment categories
Systembolaget divides its assortment into four categories:
· a basic assortment;
· a provisional assortment;
· a trial assortment; and
· a ‘by order’ assortment108.
The basic assortment comprises the most popular products, mostly
priced in a lower to medium-range category, which are available
                                                
100 Art. 11 of the agreement between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish State (SFS
2001:852).
101 http://www.systembolaget.se/english/shops.htm (2002/05/27, 14:59).
102 S. supra, II. 3.
103 Proposition 1993/94:136, p. 7; s. also supra, II. 3.
104 Proposition 1993/94:136, p. 8.
105 Ibidem.
106 Art. 4 of the agreement between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish State (SFS
2001:852).
107 Art. 7 of the agreement between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish State (SFS
2001:852).
108 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/fragor/levinfo/xindex.htm (2002/04/12,
16:19h); ERICSSON, p. 8; Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in case C-189/95,
para. 24.
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around the year109. The provisional assortment is made up of new
products, whose acceptance on the market has yet to be evaluated as
well as seasonal products110. All new products are presented in a
monthly brochure called ‘Varunytt’, which is available in all shops
and by subscription111. The trial assortment is made up of products
which Systembolaget has refused to include in its provisional
assortment but which are sold by way of trial on request of the
supplier112. The ‘by order’ assortment includes products which
Systembolaget does not stock but which are stocked by licensed
wholesalers113. Products in this assortment appear in a special price
list and can be ordered by customers and are normally delivered
within one week114. Finally, products that are not included in any of
these assortments can be imported by Systembolaget at the request
of a customer115. The minimum quantity which can be ordered is one
case116. Handling and transport costs as well as any duties must be
paid by the customer117.
The products included in the basic assortment, the provisional
assortment and the trial assortment appear in an overall pricelist and
form the basis of the products which are available in Systembolaget’s
shops118. In April 2002 this list contained more than 3,700 alcoholic
beverages in a wide range of both price and quality119. For example,
the cheapest bottle of red wine, an Italian wine named «Lancellotta»,
was priced at SEK 29.00; at the other end of the price range, a bottle
of 1982 Château Latour was offered at SEK 5,858.00. Only a small
number of shops have all the products appearing in the overall
pricelist in stock; however, all products are available to order in all
shops120.
                                                
109 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/fragor/levinfo/xindex.htm (2002/05/28,
10:26h); Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in case C-189/95, para. 24.
110 Report of the Swedish competition authority to the Commission of December 21,
2001 (Dnr 28/2001), p. 1; http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/fragor/levinfo/
xindex.htm (2002/04/12, 16:19h).
111 Report of the Swedish competition authority to the Commission of December 21,
2001 (Dnr 28/2001), p. 1.
112 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/fragor/levinfo/xindex.htm (2002/04/12,
16:19h); Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in case C-189/95, para. 24. S. also
infra, III. 6.3.2.3.4.
113 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/fragor/levinfo/xindex.htm (2002/04/12,
16:19h); ERICSSON, p. 8; Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in case C-189/95,
para. 24.
114 Ibidem. Systembolaget counts on being able to deliver ordered products within
one or two days in the course of 2002, s. Report of the Swedish competition
authority to the Commission of December 21, 2001 (Dnr 28/2001), p. 2.
115 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/varor/braveta/varuinfo/xindex.htm
(2002/05/28, 10:29h); Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in case C-189/95, para.
24.
116 For beer the minimum quantity is ten cases; s. ibidem.
117 Ibidem.
118 ERICSSON, p. 8; Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in case C-189/95, para. 25.
119 www. systembolaget.se/svenska/varor/prislist/xindex.htm (2002/04/12, 14:21h).
120 Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in case C-189/95, para. 24.
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6.3.2.3.3. Selection of products included in the pricelists
Systembolaget's purchases for resale are centralized121. A particular
shop cannot purchase its stock independently and may only carry
products included in the company’s overall pricelist122. The selection
of products that are included in this pricelist follows a standardised
procedure.
Systembolaget draws up an annual purchase plan123. On the basis of
this plan, the company sends out invitations to tender for products of a
certain category (e.g. Rioja, red, reserva, for a maximum price of SEK
79.00) to registered consignees and approved warehouse keepers
approximately once a month124. Traders who are neither consignees
registered with nor warehouse keepers approved by the Swedish tax
authority are unable to tender125. In practice, this means that tenders
can only be made by traders with a registered office in Sweden, since
others will not obtain such approval or registration126.
The tenders received are first examined by Systembolaget’s buyers,
who make an evaluation of the price and quality of the products127.
Following this initial examination approximately two thirds of the
tenders are rejected128. The products which have been deemed to be
interesting then undergo a blind test by five of Systembolaget’s
testers129. The products obtaining the highest scores are purchased
and included in the provisional assortment130. Only some ten per cent
of the tested products are eventually purchased, which means that
only one out of thirty tenders is accepted by Systembolaget131. The
products are then sold in Systembolaget’s shops for an initial 52
                                                
121 Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in case C-189/95, para. 18;
http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/fragor/levinfo/xindex.htm (2002/05/28, 10:26)
122 Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in case C-189/95, para. 18.
123 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/fragor/levinfo/xindex.htm (2002/04/13,
13:02h).
124 Ibidem; Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in case C-189/95, para. 26; «Lagligt
att minska utbud på Systemet», SvD of 2001/08/07; s. supra, III. 5.
125 S. supra, III. 5.
126 S. ibidem.
127 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/fragor/levinfo/xindex.htm (2002/04/13,
13:02h); Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in case C-189/95, para. 27; «Lagligt att
minska utbud på Systemet», SvD of 2001/08/07.
128 E-mail of Kajsa Riddersporre, market and communications department at
Systembolaget of May 8, 2002.
129 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/fragor/levinfo/xindex.htm (2002/04/13,
13:02h); «Lagligt att minska utbud på Systemet», SvD of 2001/08/07.
130 Ibidem. Likewise, products listed in the ‘by order’ assortment which reach a
certain sales volume will also be included in the provisional assortment; Report of
the Swedish competition authority to the Commission of December 21, 2001 (Dnr
28/2001), p. 2.
131 E-mail of Kajsa Riddersporre, market and communications department at
Systembolaget of May 8, 2002.
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weeks132. For wine the initial period is 26 weeks133. Products which
reach a certain volume of sales during this period are included in the
basic assortment134.
Where Systembolaget has decided not to purchase a product and to
include it in the provisional assortment, the trader whose offer has
been rejected may request a trial sale135. The product is then tested
together with other products in the same product category and price
range by a panel of independent consumers136. If the product obtains a
majority of positive votes, it will be included in the trial assortment and
put on the market in the same way as products in the provisional
assortment137.
The products included in the basic assortment are re-evaluated on a
yearly basis138. If a product is to remain in the basic assortment, it must
reach a minimum sales volume139. Products failing to fulfil this
requirement will in principle be taken out of the assortment140.
However, Systembolaget is free to take special circumstances into
consideration141. If a product is dropped from any of Systembolaget’s
assortments or has been rejected by the consumer panel, it cannot be
reconsidered before two years have elapsed142.
Where Systembolaget has decided not to include a certain product in
its basic, provisional or trial assortment or to take a certain product out
of its assortment, the trader considered may ask Systembolaget to
state the grounds for its decision143. Moreover, he may appeal the
decision to the Alcohol Assortment Board144. The board will then
examine whether Systembolaget has infringed its obligations
                                                
132 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/fragor/levinfo/xindex.htm (2002/04/13,
13:02h).
133 Ibidem.
134 Ibidem; «Systemet kapar rejält i sortimentet», SvD of 2001/08/05.
135 Report of the Swedish competition authority to the Commission of December 21,
2001 (Dnr 28/2001), p. 3; http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/fragor/levinfo/
xindex.htm (2002/04/13, 13:02h).
136 Ibidem.
137 Report of the Swedish competition authority to the Commission of December 21,
2001 (Dnr 28/2001), p. 3.
138 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/fragor/levinfo/xindex.htm (2002/04/13,
13:02h).
139 Report of the Swedish competition authority to the Commission of December 21,
2001 (Dnr 28/2001), p. 1.
140 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/fragor/levinfo/xindex.htm (2002/04/13,
13:02h).
141 Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in case C-189/95, para. 32.
142 Report of the Swedish competition authority to the Commission of December 21,
2001 (Dnr 28/2001), p. 4.
143 Art. 4 of the agreement between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish State (SFS
2001:852).
144 Art. 2 of förordning (1994:2048) med instruktion för Alkoholsortimentsnämnden.
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regarding the selection criteria145. The board’s decision cannot be
appealed146 and is binding on Systembolaget147.
6.3.2.3.4. Selection of products available in shops
As mentioned above, only a small number of shops carry the full
basic assortment148. Smaller shops have to make a selection as to
which products should be kept in stock. This selection was previously
within the responsibility of the shop managers. In August 2001,
however, Systembolaget decided to further centralise the selection
procedure149. Only 20 per cent of the products are now selected by the
respective shop managers150. The rest is centrally selected by
Systembolaget’s management according to quantitative criteria151.
The smallest shops now only carry the very best selling products of
each category152. Less popular products are only available in medium-
sized or even only in the largest shops153.
In detail, the new selection procedure works as follows: The basic
assortment is divided into product categories, namely:
· red wines;
· white wines;
· other wines (e.g. rosé and sparkling wines);
· spirits;
· beer and cider; and
· non-alcoholic drinks154.
These categories are in turn sub-divided into product segments. In
the case of red wine, these are:
· bag-in-box;
· Tetra-Pak;
· glass bottle priced SEK 0-59;
· glass bottle priced SEK 60-69;
· glass bottle priced SEK 70-79;
· glass bottle priced SEK 80-99; and
                                                
145 Ibidem.
146 Art. 10 of förordning (1994:2048) med instruktion för Alkoholsortimentsnämnden.
147 Art. 5 of the agreement between Systembolaget AB and the Swedish State (SFS
2001:852).
148 S. supra, III. 6.3.2.3.2.
149 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/temp/vadhander/xindex.htm (2002/04/13,
12:04h); «Systemet kapar rejält i sortimentet», SvD of 2001/08/05; «Systemet
kritiseras för minskat utbut», SvD of 2001/08/06; «Lagligt att minska utbud på
Systemet», SvD of 2001/08/07; «Monopolet i farozonen», DN of 2001/08/07; «Styrt
sortiment ska ge lönsamhet», DN of 2001/08/07; «Systembolaget bantar utbudet»,
Aftonbladet of 2001/08/05.
150 Ibidem.
151 Ibidem.
152 Ibidem.
153 Ibidem.
154 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/varor/prislist/xindex.htm (2002/04/15,
13:33h).
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· glass bottle priced over SEK 100155.
The best selling products of every product segment form the so-called
basic module, which is available in all shops156. In August 2001, 362
products were included in this basic module, of which 20 were red
wines and 20 white wines157. Every fourth of Systembolaget’s shops
now only carries this minimum assortment complemented by the
products selected by the shop manager158. Less popular products are
included in supplementary modules, which are only available in
larger shops159.
7. Serving
Under ch. 6 art. 1, para. 1 AL a licence is required for the serving of
spirits, wine and strong beer160. Beer with an alcohol content of up to
3.5 per cent by volume may be served without a licence in premises
which are approved for the sale of foodstuffs provided that the beer is
served together with food161.
A licence is tied both to the person of the licensee and to the
premises as specified therein and can therefore not be transferred to
another person or other premises162. It may confer the right to serve all
categories of alcoholic beverages or may be limited to one or two of
these categories163. Several operational provisions must be observed
in the exercise of this right164.
The beverages for which the licence is valid must be purchased from
legitimate wholesalers or from Systembolaget AB165. If the licence has
been granted only for one single occasion or for a limited period of
time the beverages may be purchased only from Systembolaget AB166.
                                                
155 «Lagligt att minska utbud på Systemet», SvD of 2001/08/07.
156 Ibidem.
157 http://www.systembolaget.se/svenska/temp/vadhander/xindex.htm (2002/04/13,
12:04h); «Systemet kapar rejält i sortimentet», SvD of 2001/08/05.
158 «Systemet kapar rejält i sortimentet», SvD of 2001/08/05.
159 Ibidem.
160 For exceptions to the licence requirement s. ch. 6 art. 1, para. 2 AL.
161 Ch. 6 art. 1 a, para. 1 AL.
162 Ch. 7 art. 10 AL; BILLUM/GROTH/ HAMMAR, p. 95-96.
163 Ch. 7 art. 5, para. 1 AL.
164 S. e.g. ch. 3 art. 6 and 8 and ch. 6 art. 2-4 and 6-9 AL.
165 Ch. 6 art. 5 AL in connection with art. 2 of the contract between Systembolaget
AB and the Swedish State (SFS 2001:852).
166 Ibidem.
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8. Marketing
The general rule regarding the marketing of alcoholic beverages to
consumers can be found in ch. 4 art. 8, para. 1 AL: «Marketing of
alcoholic beverages directed towards consumers is to be carried out
with particular  restraint. Advertising or other means of marketing
which are obtrusive or insisting or which encourage the consumption
of alcohol are prohibited.» Para. 2 of the aforementioned provision
contains a prohibition of any kind of marketing which is directed
particularly towards children or youths.
The marketing of alcoholic beverages by means of media advertising
is subject to strong restrictions. While television and radio advertising
is prohibited for all kinds of alcoholic beverages167 only beer with an
alcohol content of up to 3.5 per cent by volume may be advertised in
periodicals168. Spirits, wine and strong beer may only be advertised in
publications which are available only at places where these
beverages are sold169.
However, this prohibition of alcohol advertising in periodicals has
been declared incompatible with Art. 28 and 49 EC in a recent
judgement of a Stockholm court170. The court was not convinced that a
lifting of this ban would have considerable effects on the consumption
of alcohol since alcohol is advertised in foreign media which are
freely available in Sweden. On the other hand, the court found it likely
that the admission of alcohol advertising in Swedish periodicals
would lead to a certain increase of alcohol sales. It therefore
concluded that the Swedish ban on alcohol advertising in periodicals
was unproportionate and could not be upheld. A final decision on the
compatibility of the Swedish legislation on alcohol advertising with
EC law will be given by the Stockholm Commercial Court, to whom
the judgement has been appealed171.
9. Taxation
The production or import of alcohol of any kind is in principle subject
to alcohol tax172. The rate of taxation is essentially dependent on two
factors: the type of alcohol and the alcohol content. Beer is subject to
                                                
167 Ch. 4 art. 10 AL; for the applicability of this prohibition to satellite television s. ch.
4 art. 10 AL in connection with art. 1 and 2 radio- och TV lag (1996:844).
168 Ch. 4 art. 11 AL e contrario.
169 Ibidem.
170 Judgement T 8-1111-97.
171 «Fritt fram för alkoholreklamen», SvD of 2002/03/06; «Historisk dom om
alkoholreklam», GP of 2002/03/05.
172 Art. 1, para. 1 LAS; for exceptions s. art. 7 LAS.
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a tax of SEK 1.47 per litre for every per cent of alcohol by volume173.
For wine and other fermented beverages the tax is imposed
progressively, depending on the alcohol content. The tax rate varies
between SEK 7.58 and SEK 45.17 per litre for wine174 and between
SEK 7.58 and SEK 22.08 for other fermented beverages175. Ethyl
alcohol is taxed at a rate of SEK 501.41 per litre of pure alcohol176.
10. Penalties
Infringements of the provisions laid down in the Law on Alcohol may
lead to severe punishment. Under ch. 10 art. 1 and 2 of the Law on
Alcohol, anyone who unlawfully produces spirits or sells spirits, wine
or beer with an alcohol content exceeding 3.5 per cent by volume is
liable to a fine or to a sentence of up to two years’ imprisonment177.
Likewise, anyone who imports or exports such beverages without
being entitled to do so or failing to declare such importation or
exportation is subject to a fine or imprisonment of up to two years178.
Persons contravening the prohibition of television and radio
advertising can be punished by a fine of up to SEK 5 million179.
Unlawful advertisements in periodicals can be prohibited from further
publication and may lead to the imposition of a fine180.
Other offences include the unlawful production of wine or beer181, the
purchase of alcoholic beverages for a person who is not herself
entitled to buy such beverages182 and the sale of alcoholic beverages
                                                
173 Art. 2 LAS; no tax is due for beer with an alcohol content of up to 2.8 per cent by
volume, s. art. 2, para. 4 LAS.
174 Art. 3 LAS; no tax is due for wine with an alcohol content of up to 2.25 per cent
by volume, s. art. 3, para. 7 LAS. Before December 1, 2001 higher tax rates were
imposed on wine than on beer. According to the Commission this different taxation
constituted an infringement of Art. 90 EC. Subsequent to a formal notice of the
Commission the tax rates for wines with an alcohol content of 2.25 per cent to 15
per cent per volume were lowered by 18.8 per cent, thus eliminating the differences
in taxation between beer and wines; s. proposition 2000/01:144, pp. 8 and 9; «Sänk
skatten - annars domstol», Aftonbladet of 2001/06/12; «Schwedens Steuerprotektion
für einheimisches Bier», NZZ of 2001/06/12.
175 Art. 4 LAS; no tax is due for fermented beverages with an alcohol content of up to
2.25 per cent by volume, s. art. 4, para. 6 LAS.
176 Art. 6 LAS; art. 6, para. 1 LAS provides for an exception for certain types of ethyl
alcohol whose alcohol content does not exceed 1.2 per cent.
177 In serious cases, the sentence can be up to four years’  imprisonment; ch. 10 art.
3 AL.
178 Ch. 10 art. 10 AL in connection with art. 3 and 8 lag (2000:1225) om straff för
smuggling. In serious cases, the sentece can be up to six years’ imprisonment; ch.
10 art. 10 AL in connection with art. 5 and 10 lag (2000:1225) om straff för
smuggling.
179 Ch. 4 art. 12 i.f. AL in connection with art. 24 marknadsföringslag (1995:450).
180 Ch. 4 art. 12 i.f. AL in connection with art. 14 marknadsföringslag (1995:450).
181 Ch. 10 art. 4 AL.
182 Ch. 10 art. 6 in connection with ch. 3 art. 9 AL.
26
to intoxicated or underage persons183. Anyone committing such an
offence is liable to a fine or imprisonment184.
11. Excurs: The Norwegian and Finnish
Alcohol Monopolies
With the exception of Denmark, all nordic countries have traditionally
pursued a restrictive alcohol policy. The common overriding objective
of these policies has always been to reduce individual and social
harm as a result of alcohol consumption by means of restricting
availability and eliminating private-profit interests. Consequently,
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden all have placed the retail trade
in alcohol in the hands of monopoly undertakings. In the following, a
short overview shall be given of the Norwegian and Finnish alcohol
monopolies.
11.1. The Norwegian alcohol monopoly
The existence and operation of the Norwegian retail monopoly for
alcoholic beverages is governed by the Alcohol Act185. Similar to the
Swedish legislation, the Alcohol Act provides that spirits, wine and
‘strong beer’ may only be sold by retail by a State-owned monopoly
undertaking, A/S Vinmonopolet186. The term ‘strong beer’ is defined as
beer containing more than 4.75 per cent alcohol by volume187. Beer
with an alcohol content between 2.5 per cent and 4.75 per cent by
volume may be sold by grocery shops on the basis of a municipal
licence188. Since this provision only applies to beer but not to other
alcoholic beverages, however, it has been found to be contrary to Art.
16 of the EEA agreement (which corresponds to Art. 31 EC) by the
EFTA Court189. The Norwegian government has therefore proposed to
                                                
183 Ch. 10 art. 7, para. 1 i.i. in connection with ch. 3 art. 8 AL.
184 Ch. 10 art. 4, 6 and 7 AL.
185 Lov om omsetning av alkoholhaltig drikk m.v. of June 2, 1989.
186 Ch. 3 art. 3-1, para. 1 Alcohol Act (Lov om omsetning av alkoholhaltig drikk m.v.
of June 2, 1989).
187 Ibidem. S. ch. 1 art. 6 AL, which draws the dividing line at 3.5 per cent alcohol by
volume.
188 Ch. 3 art. 3-1, para. 2 Alcohol Act (Lov om omsetning av alkoholhaltig drikk m.v.
of June 2, 1989). Beverages containing less than 2.5 per cent alcohol by volume are
not considered to be alcoholic beverages and may thus be freely sold; Ch. 1 art. 1-3,
para. 1 Alcohol Act.
189 Case E-9/00. The EFTA Court held that a provsion which allows (mostly
domestically produced) beer with an alcohol content between 2.5 per cent and 4.75
per cent alcohol by volume to be sold in grocery shops while requiring that other
alcoholic beverages of the same strength be sold only through a monopoly
undertaking was discriminatory.
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allow also other alcoholic beverages of the same strength to be sold
in grocery shops190.
At the beginning of the year 2001, Vinmonopolet operated 140
outlets, while the number of grocery stores selling beer was around
4,400191. In areas where Vinmonopolet does not operate an outlet, all
alcoholic beverages retailled by Vinmonopolet can be ordered by
telephone, fax or e-mail and are shipped free of charge.
The procedure by which Vinmonopolet selects its products is very
similar to the one followed by Systembolaget. Based on an annual
marketing and product plan, Vinmonopolet invites potential suppliers
to make offers for particular products192. Products are selected mainly
on the basis of their price and quality193. The selection procedure may
also include an (optional) blind test194. The selection must be made in
a non-discriminatory manner195 and is subject to the control of a board
which is independent from both Vinmonopolet and the Norwegian
government196.
Similar to Systembolaget, Vinmonopolet divides its total product
range into five assortments197. The basic, test and ‘by order’
assortments are comparable to Systembolaget’s corresponding
assortments198. However, while only a small number of products are
included in Systembolaget’s test assortment199, Vinmonopolet’s
equivalent shall comprise at least ten per cent of the number of
products included in the basic assortment200. Vinmonopolet’s product
range also comprises a ‘limited consignment’ assortment, which
consists of goods that are available only during a limited period of
                                                
190 http://odin.dep.no/sos/norsk/044051-070008/index-dok000-b-f-a.html (2002/05/02,
17:11h).
191 http://www.vinmonopolet.no/vp_reader.asp?page_id=291 (2002/05/15, 17:35h);
Report for the Hearing in Case E-9/00, para. 7.
192 Ch. 2 art. 2-3 in connection with ch. 3 art. 3-2, para. 1 of the Regulation on
Vinmonopolet’s purchasing activity (Forskrift om Vinmonopolets innkjøpsvirksomhet
m.v. of November 30, 1995).
193 Ch. 3 art. 3-2, para. 2 of the Regulation on Vinmonopolet’s purchasing activity
(Forskrift om Vinmonopolets innkjøpsvirksomhet m.v. of November 30, 1995).
194 Ch. 3 art. 3-4, para. 1 of the Regulation on Vinmonopolet’s purchasing activity
(Forskrift om Vinmonopolets innkjøpsvirksomhet m.v. of November 30, 1995).
195 Ch. 3 art. 3-1, para. 5 Alcohol Act (Lov om omsetning av alkoholhaltig drikk m.v.
of June 2, 1989).
196 Forskrift om nemnd for prøving av A/S Vinmonopolets beslutninger om innkjøp of
January 24, 1996.
197 Ch. 1 art. 1-4, para. 1 of the Regulation on Vinmonopolet’s purchasing activity
(Forskrift om Vinmonopolets innkjøpsvirksomhet m.v. of November 30, 1995).
198 S. supra, III. 6.3.2.3.2.
199 In mid-October 2001, Systembolaget’s test assortment comprised 89 articles; s.
the Report of the Swedish competition authority to the Commission of December 21,
2001 (Dnr 28/2001), p. 6.
200 Ch. 5 art. 5-3, para. 1 of the Regulation on Vinmonopolet’s purchasing activity
(Forskrift om Vinmonopolets innkjøpsvirksomhet m.v. of November 30, 1995).
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time and in limited quantities and are carried only in selected shops201.
The supplementary assortment, finally, contains products that are
particularly popular in certain regions and may be selected by all
outlets in order to meet regional demands202.
11.2. The Finnish alcohol monopoly
The provisions governing the Finnish monopoly for the retail sale of
alcoholic beverages are laid down in the Finnish Law on Alcohol203.
Under art. 3, para. 1 (4) in connection with art. 13, para. 1 and art. 14,
para. 1 of this law, alcoholic beverages with an alcohol content of
more than 4.7 per cent by volume may be retailled only by Alko Oy, a
company owned entirely by the Finnish State. Fermented beverages
with a lower alcohol content may be sold in other shops, on the basis
of a county licence204.
Alko Oy currently operates approximately 290 shops and a network of
approximately 140 agents throughout Finland205. The products
available in these shops and through these agents are selected on
the basis of offers and samples submitted by Alko’s suppliers206. In
contrast to the Swedish and Norwegian monopolies, offers can be
submitted at any time; an invitation to tender is not required207. The
selection is made by one of Alko’s expert teams on the basis of
criteria such as the estimated demand, the price of the product and its
price-quality ratio208. The suppliers’ nationality or domicile must be
irrelevant for the decision of the expert teams209. Alko’s decisions
regarding the listing, delisting and pricing of products can be
appealed to the product control agency (produkttillsysncentralen),
which is subordinated to the Ministry of Welfare and Health210.
The general assortment forms the basis of the products available in
Alko’s shops and corresponds to Systembolaget’s and
Vinmonopolet’s basic assortments211. Products that do not reach the
                                                
201 E-mail from Bernt Rivelsrud, product department at A/S Vinmonopolet of May 7,
2002.
202 Ch. 4 art. 4-1 of the Regulation on Vinmonopolet’s purchasing activity (Forskrift
om Vinmonopolets innkjøpsvirksomhet m.v. of November 30, 1995).
203 Alkohollagen (Nr. 1143/1994).
204 Art. 14, para. 1 Alkohollag (Nr. 1143/1994).
205 http://www.alko.fi/wwwalkofi/wwwMyyrek.nsf/frmBottomSW?readform
(2002/05/22, 11:53).
206 «Listing procedure and retail sale of alcoholic beverages», version of January 1,
2002, p. 3.
207 Ibidem.
208 Ibidem.
209 «Listing procedure and retail sale of alcoholic beverages», version of January 1,
2002, p. 2.
210 Art. 51, para. 3 and art. 41, para. 1 Alkohollag (1143/1994).
211 «Listing procedure and retail sale of alcoholic beverages», version of January 1,
2002, p. 2.
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required sales volumes for the general assortment or products that
are not available in sufficient amounts can be included in the ‘by
order’ assortment212. In contrast to Systembolaget and Vinmonopolet,
Alko does not have a trial assortment. However, a supplier whose
offer may apply for the offered product to be listed in the general
assortment at his own risk213. Moreover, Alko’s shops may have in
their selections up to ten products from the ‘by order’ assortment214.
                                                
212 «Listing procedure and retail sale of alcoholic beverages», version of January 1,
2002, p. 3.
213 «Listing procedure and retail sale of alcoholic beverages», version of January 1,
2002, p. 5.
214 «Listing procedure and retail sale of alcoholic beverages», version of January 1,
2002, p. 3.
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IV. The Compatibility of the
Swedish Alcohol
Monopoly with EC Law
1. General Remarks
Systembolaget’s retail sales monopoly has been scrutinized by the
ECJ in the well-known Franzén case215. Much to the surprise of many
commentators, the retail monopoly was upheld by the ECJ216.
However, the judgement does not, in my view, answer once and for
all the question of whether or not the Swedish alcohol monopoly is
compatible with EC law. Firstly, it is unclear whether the Court’s
decision to examine the monopoly solely under Art. 31 EC (and not
under Art. 28 EC) is to be regarded as a general change of practice or
a political decision. Secondly, Systembolaget’s new product policy
has changed the factual circumstances considerably217. Thirdly, the
compatibility of the monopoly with the competition rules of the EC
Treaty has not been examined by the judgement. A renewed scrutiny
of the Swedish retail monopoly for alcoholic beverages, which takes
into account these circumstances, is therefore anything but obsolete.
2. The Franzén case
2.1. Facts of the case
On the night of January 1, 1995, the day of Sweden’s accesson to the
EU, Harry Franzén sold 20 bottles and one five-litre carton of wine in
his grocery shop in the Swedish town Röstånga218. Mr. Franzén was
prosecuted for the unlawful sale of alcoholic beverages and other
criminal offences. He denied having committed an offence and
claimed that the Swedish legislation on which the criminal charges
were based was contrary to Art. 28 and 30 EC. The Swedish court
stayed the proceedings and submitted a number of questions to the
ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
                                                
215 Case C-189/95.
216 Ibidem. S. ERIKSSON, pp. 2 and 54; FRITZ, p. 90; PEHRSON/WAHL, p. 834;
SLOT, p. 1194.
217 S. supra, III. 6.3.2.3.4.
218 The summary of the facts is based on that given in the Opinion of Advocate
General Elmer in case C-189/95, paras. 38-40.
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2.2. The Opinion of Advocate General Elmer
In his Opinion delivered to the ECJ on March 4, 1997, Advocate
General Elmer found the Swedish legislation on the retail sale of
alcohol to be incompatible with Art. 28 and 31 EC219. He proposed to
scrutinize the Swedish statutory system on alcohol as a whole and, in
line with previous case-law of the Court220, to examine this system
both under Art. 28 and 31 EC. In his view, Art. 31 (1) EC was
designed to supplement the rules laid down in Art. 28 and 29 EC and
could not be seen a derogation of these articles. Accordingly, State
monopolies were prohibited if they infringed either Art. 28 or Art. 31
EC.
Advocate General Elmer found that the limitation of the number of
points of sale, the centralisation of Systembolaget’s purchases,
Systembolaget’s selection procedure and the then valid provisions on
the importation of alcohol had the effect of impeding the access of
goods from other Member States to the Swedish market and
discriminated against traders from other Member States. In his view,
the Swedish legislation could not be justified by Art. 30 EC because it
did not meet the proportionality test.
2.3. The judgement of the Court
The ECJ followed an approach which was fundamentally different
from the one that Advocate General Elmer had proposed221. Instead of
examining the Swedish statutory system as a whole, it chose to deal
with the provisions regarding the retail monopoly and those regarding
the importation of alcoholic beverages separately. It declared that the
rules relating to the existence and operation of the monopoly would
have to be examined only under Art. 31 EC, while the rules relating to
intra-Community trade (i.e. the import rules) would have to be
assessed under Art. 28 and 30 EC.
The Court came to the conclusion that the provisions regarding the
retail monopoly were not discriminative and therefore compatible with
Art. 31 EC. The rules governing the importation of alcoholic
beverages, on the other hand, were held to be contrary to Art. 28 EC
and could not be justified under Art. 30 EC.
                                                
219 Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in case C-189/95, para. 124.
220 Case 45/75; Case C-347/88; Case C-387/93; ERIKSSON, p. 54; FRITZ, p. 94;
PEHRSON/WAHL, p. 838.
221 Case C-189/95, paras. 35-36. S. FRITZ, p. 90; PEHRSON/WAHL, p. 837; SLOT, p.
1194.
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3. Free Movement of Goods
3.1. Preliminary remarks
In this section the Swedish statutory rules related to the retail sale of
alcoholic beverages shall be examined against the Treaty rules on
the free movement of goods. This examination is carried out in three
steps. Firstly, it will be discussed whether Art. 28 EC remains
applicable to State monopolies of a commercial character even after
Franzén or whether such monopolies will only have to be examined
under Art. 31 EC in the future. Secondly, the compatibility of the
Swedish alcohol monopoly with Art. 31 EC will be discussed in the
light of the Franzén judgement. Thirdly, the monopoly will be
examined against Art. 28 EC. At the beginning of each of these steps,
a short overview will be given of the content of the respective
provisions as well as the most relevant case-law of the ECJ related
thereto.
3.2. The relationship between Article 31 EC and Articles 28-
30 EC
3.2.1. Monist and dualist approaches
Art. 28 and 29 EC prohibit all quantitative restrictions on imports and
exports between Member States and all measures having equivalent
effect. Art. 31 (1) EC requires Member States to adjust their State
monopolies of a commercial character in such a way that any
discrimination between nationals of Member States regarding the
procurement and marketing of goods is removed. In that such State
monopolies constitute an obstacle to intra-Community trade, they
constitute a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative
restrictions on import or export222. Art. 28 and 29 EC on the one hand
and Art. 31 (1) EC on the other therefore clearly overlap. It is therefore
necessary to clarify the relationship between these provisions223. Two
main approaches have been suggested to solve this problem: one
solution is to identify one sole applicable rule (monist approach), the
other to apply both rules jointly (dualist approach)224.
The monist approach allows in turn three possible solutions: Some
authors suggest that the former Art. 37 (1) EC (now Art. 31 (1) EC)
has lost all its significance after the end of the transitional period and
that only Art. 30 or 34 EC (now 28 and 29 EC) should apply225. The
fact that the post-Amsterdam wording of Art. 31 EC does no longer
mention a transitional period but that the rest of the provision is still in
                                                
222 HEINEMANN, p. 108.
223 BUENDIA SIERRA, p. 112.
224 Ibidem.
225 Ibidem, with further references.
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force is, however, a clear indication against this view. Others argue
that Art. 31 (1) EC is a lex specialis to Art. 28 and 29 EC and should
therefore prevail226. However, if Art. 31 EC were to prevail over Art. 28
and 29 EC, this would lead to the result that State monopolies of a
commercial character would be privileged over other restrictions. Art.
28 and 29 EC prohibit restrictions of all kinds while only
discriminatory restrictions are prohibited under Art. 31 (1) EC227. In
order to avoid such a result, it has been suggested that Art. 31 (1) EC
should be interpreted in the light of the Dassonville-formula228. Art. 31
(1) would thus prohibit not only discriminations but also other
quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect229.
Finally, it has been submitted that measures intrinsically connected
with the operation of the monopoly should be examined solely under
Art. 31 (1) EC while Art. 28 and 29 EC should be applicable to all
other provisions of national law (doctrine of separable measures)230.
The dualist approach does not try to identify one single applicable
rule, but allows for a joint application of both provisions to the same
measure231. This can be done either by using Art. 31 (1) EC as a
reference rule to Art. 28 and 29 EC, prohibiting those State
monopolies of a commercial character which are incompatible with
the latter provisions232, or by applying Art. 31 (1) EC to discriminatory
and Art. 28 and 29 EC to non-discriminatory measures233.
In my view, it is this last solution that is the most convincing one. It is
compatible with both the wording of the provisions in question and
the history behind the creation of the former Art. 37 EC234. Moreover, it
is easy to apply in practice. The supporters of the dualist approach
argue convincingly that Art. 31 EC is designed to supplement Art. 28
and 29 EC; the fact that State monopolies of a commercial character
are dealt with in a special provision merely stresses the dangers for
the free movement of goods that emanate from such monopolies and
the necessity to effectively oppose these dangers235. The
                                                
226 BUENDIA SIERRA, pp. 113 and 219.
227 HEINEMANN, p. 109; PEHRSON/WAHL, p. 840.
228 Case 8/74.
229 HEINEMANN, p. 109, with further references.
230 BUENDIA SIERRA, p. 113; SAVIA, p. 58.
231 BUENDIA SIERRA, p. 114, with further reference.
232 BUENDIA SIERRA, pp. 117-188. Art. 31 EC would then have a similar role as Art.
86 (1) EC.
233 BUENDIA SIERRA, pp. 114-115; HEINEMANN, p. 110.
234 Initially, the contracting States did not intend to include a special provision on
State monopolies in the EC Treaty; State monopolies should instead be dealt with
under the general provisions. However, it was decided during the negotiations to
emphasise the particular dangers emanating from State monopolies for the free
movement of goods by expressly mentioning these monopolies in the Treaty. S.
HEINEMANN, pp. 101 and 108.
235 HEINEMANN, p. 108; Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in case C-189/95, para.
71.
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interpretation of Art. 31 EC as a lex specialis to Art. 28 and 29 EC on
the other hand seems convincing at first sight, but would lead to the
paradox result that State monopolies as one of the gravest forms of
impediments against the free movement of goods would be privileged
over less harmful measures236. An analogical application of the
Dassonville-formula to Art. 31 (1) EC would stretch the provision far
beyond its wording. The doctrine of separable measures, finally, can
be difficult to apply in practice. The dividing line between rules
relating to the existence and the operation of the monopoly and rules
that, even though having an effect on intra-Community trade, do not
directly concern the monopoly is most often blurred or even
impossible to identify237.
If Art. 31 (1) EC and Art. 28 and 29 EC are applied jointly in the
manner suggested above, it would be logical to examine a national
measure first under Art. 31 (1) EC. If the measure is found to be
discriminative, a test under Art. 28 or 29 EC is not required. If it is not,
the measure must be examined under Art. 28 or 29 EC238. The
examination of the Swedish alcohol monopoly carried out hereafter
therefore follows this pattern.
3.2.2. The position of the ECJ
The Court’s position regarding the relationship between Art. 31 EC
and general provisions of the Treaty has been, to say the least,
inconsistent. In the early case Rewe-Zentrale239, the Court applied Art.
31 EC and Art. 90 EC jointly. In the Miritz-jugement240, published on
the same day, it refused to consider Art. 25 EC and instead applied
Art. 31 EC exclusively. In Manghera241, another case handed down in
the same year, the Court seemed to have abandoned this latter
approach again242. In the following years, the Court has sometimes
applied both Art. 31 (1) EC and general Treaty provisions such as Art.
28, 29 and 90 EC either jointly243 or following the doctrine of separable
measures244 and sometimes examined exclusive rights solely under
                                                
236 HEINEMANN, pp. 5 and 108-109; PEHRSON/WAHL, p. 840.
237 SLOT, p. 1194.
238 Ibidem; Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas in Cases C-157-160/94.
239 Case 45/75.
240 Case 91/75.
241 Case 59/75, para. 9.
242 Para. 6 of the judgement reads: «For the purposes of interpreting Article [31] [...]
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of the Treaty.» And in para. 9 of the judgement the Court states that «the obligation
laid down in paragraph (1) aims at ensuring compliance with the fundamental rule on
the free movement of goods throughout the common market, in particular by the
abolition of quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect in trade
between Member States.». S. also ERIKSSON, p. 31.
243 Case 90/82; Case C-347/88; Case C-387/93. S. also Cases C-157-159/94, where
an examination of exclusive rights under Art. 28 and 34 was not necessary because
they were contrary to Art. 31.
244 Case 119/78; Case 120/78.
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the general provisions, leaving Art. 31 (1) EC aside245. In any event,
the case-law of the Court seemed to suggest that Art. 28 and 29 EC
were applicable to State monopolies of a commercial character at
least jointly with Art. 31 EC246.
3.2.3. The approach of the ECJ in the Franzén-judgement
It came therefore as a great surprise when the ECJ in Franzén247
examined the Swedish retail monopoly for alcoholic beverages solely
under Art. 31 EC and refused to apply Art. 28 EC248. Remarkably, the
Court did not bother to clarify the relationship between Art. 28 and 31
EC, an issue which at least seemed to trouble its Advocate General,
nor did it give any explanations for its change of direction249. In para.
35 of the judgement it merely stated:
«Having regard to the case-law of the Court, it is
necessary to examine the rules relating to the existence
and operation of the monopoly with reference to Article
[31] of the Treaty, which is specifically applicable to
the exercise, by a domestic commercial monopoly, of its
exclusive rights250.»
Another remarkable aspect is that the Court did not seem to have any
difficulty in distinguishing between the rules concerning the monopoly
and those affecting intra-Community trade251. In support of its view the
Court made reference to its judgements in the Miritz252, Cassis de
Dijon253 and Hansen254 cases. However, it does in my view not follow
from any of these cases that Art. 31 EC is the only rule under which a
State monopoly of a commercial character should be examined255.
                                                
245 Case 86/78; Case C-202/88; Case C-369/88; Case C-60/89; Joined Cases C-
277/91, C-318/91 and C-319/91; Case C-323/93.
246 In his Opinion in the Gas and Electricity Monopoly cases, Advocate General
Cosmas even argued that the Miritz-judgement could be interpreted as being in line
with this position; s. Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas in Cases C-157-160/94,
para. 22.
247 Case C-189/95.
248 ERIKSSON, pp. 2 and 54; FRITZ, p. 90; PEHRSON/WAHL, p. 834; SLOT, p. 1194.
249 PEHRSON/WAHL, p. 837; SLOT, p. 1194.
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251 SLOT, p. 1194.
252 Case 91/75.
253 Case 120/78.
254 Case 91/78.
255 ERIKSSON, p. 54; PEHRSON/WAHL, pp. 838-839. The Miritz case dealt with the
question of whether a charge on imported alcoholic beverages is contrary to Art. 25
and 31 EC. Para. 5 of the judgement, which is referenced in the Franzén-case,
reads:
«Since the structure and character of the equalization charge link it to the system of
the German alcohol monopoly, the answer to the first question must be ascertained
from the text of Article 37, which deals specifically with the adjustment of State
monopolies.»
In para. 7 of the well-known Cassis de Dijon-judgement, to which reference is made
in the Franzén-judgement, the Court states that
«[...] Article [31] relates specifically to State monopolies of a commercial character.
This provision is therefore irrelevant with regard to national provisions which do not
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Particularly the referenced paragraphs in the Hansen (and, to a lesser
extent, also that in the Cassis de Dijon) judgements rather seem to
confirm that Art. 31 EC is applicable together with other Articles in the
Treaty256.
The Court’s view on the relationship between Art. 31 EC and Art. 28
EC as expressed in Franzén differs diametrically from its judgement
in Banchero257 regarding the Italian retail monopoly for tobacco, a
case with a similar factual background to the one in Franzén. In this
judgement, the Court first concluded that the monopoly was not
discriminatory and therefore did not infringe Art. 31 EC and went on to
examine the compatibility of the monopoly with Art. 28 EC258. The
Banchero-case was decided only two years before Franzén. Even
more surprisingly, the Franzén-judgement also contradicted the
Court’s decisions in the Gas and Electricity Monopoly cases259, which
were handed down on the same day as the Franzén-judgement. In
these cases, the Court held that the monopolies were contrary to Art.
31 EC and that it was therefore not necessary to consider whether
they are also contrary to Art. 28 EC260.
It remains to be seen whether, as some authors claim261, Franzén
marks a change of direction in the Court’s approach regarding the
relationship between Art. 28 EC (and other general provisions of the
Treaty) and Art. 31 EC in the sense that it now considers Art. 31 EC to
be exclusively applicable to State monopolies of a commercial
                                                                                                                           
concern the exercise by a public monopoly of its specific function [...]. That being
the case, the effect on intra-Community trade of the measure referred to by the
national court must be examined solely in relation to the requirements under Article
30 [...].»
In the Hansen-case, the Court had to examine the compatibility of certain taxes on
alcohol with EC law. In the paragraphs to which it makes reference in the Franzén-
judgement, para. 9 and 10, the ECJ deals with the question whether Art. 31 EC is a
lex specialis to Art. 87 and 88 EC. The relevant sentences of these paragraphs read:
«[...] Article [31] [...] and Articles [87] and [88] [...] pursue the same objective, which
is to ensure that [...] action by a State monopoly and the granting of aids do not
distort the conditions of competition within the common market or create
discrimination against the products or trade of other Member States. [...] It follows
that the operations of a State monopoly are not exempted from the application of
Article [31] by reason of the fact that they may at the same time be classified as an
aid [...]. It is therefore clear that in all cases where the arrangements for marketing a
product such as spirits entail the intervention of a public monopoly acting pursuant
to its exclusive right the specific provisions of Article [31] are applicable, even if the
relationship betwen the monopoly and producers may be in the nature of an aid. [...]»
256 ERIKSSON, p. 55; PEHRSON/WAHL, p. 839.
257 Case C-387/93.
258 BUENDIA SIERRA, pp. 115-116; ERIKSSON, p. 56; PEHRSON/WAHL, p. 838; s.
also Case E-6/96.
259 Cases C-157-160/94.
260 S. ERIKSSON, p. 56; SLOT, p. 1194.
261 FRITZ, pp. 94-95.
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character262. This would mean that, after Franzén, only discriminative
monopolies are incompatible with the rules on the free movement of
goods263. The EFTA Court’s recent judgement on the Norwegian
alcohol monopoly264 might be invoked in support of such a view. In
this judgement, the operation of the monopoly was examined under
Art. 16 EEA (which corresponds to Art. 31 EC), while Art. 11 EEA
(which corresponds to Art. 28 EC) was applied to the rules not related
to the monopoly. In my view, however, it is more likely that Franzén
must be seen as a case based solely on its specific facts and
circumstances and that Art. 28 EC therefore remains applicableto
State monopolies. It may be presumed that the ECJ would have
made an express statement if it had really felt the necessity to change
its case-law on such an important field265. Moreover, the Franzén-case
is totally at odds with the Court’s previous case-law266 and even with
the Gas and Electricity Monopoly-judgements267 handed down on the
very same day.
One possible explanation for the judgement in Franzén is that the
judges were deeply split in their opinions and that they did not want to
take a decision against a Member State in such a sensitive political
field without having a clear majority268. Another explanation would be
that the facts of the case and the party relying on EC law were «the
wrong kinds» in that the case did not concern the attempt of an
importer or producer to penetrate the Swedish market269.
3.3. Article 31 EC
3.3.1. The concept of State monopolies of a commercial
character
Art. 31 (1) EC requires the Member States to adjust any State
monopolies of a commercial character in such a way that any
discrimination between nationals of Member States as regards the
conditions under which goods are procured and marketed is
removed. Subparagraph 2 of the provision restricts the scope of Art.
31 EC to undertakings «through which a Member State, in law or in
fact, either directly or indirectly supervises, determines or appreciably
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influences imports or exports between Member States. [...]»270. Under
Art. 31 (2) EC, the introduction of new monopolies which are
incompatible with the conditions laid down in Art. 31 (1) EC is
prohibited.
In other words, Art. 31 (1) EC applies to situations where there is
· a monopoly, which has been
· created by a Member State and through which that State can
· appreciably influence the import or export of goods between
Member States271.
In the economic sense, a (perfect) monopoly is defined as a situation
where a single provider of goods or services has 100 per cent control
of the market for the goods or services he provides272. From a legal
point of view, however, a total control of the market is not required273. It
is sufficient that an undertaking to which exclusive rights have been
granted has as its object transactions regarding a commercial product
which can be subject of trade between Member States, and that this
undertaking plays an effective part in such trade274.
A State monopoly is defined as an undertaking to which special or
exclusive rights have been granted by an authoritative act275. It is of a
commercial character if it relates to the trade in goods276. However, not
all such monopolies fall within the scope of Art. 31 EC. Art. 31 (1)
subparagraph 2 EC restricts the scope of Art. 31 EC to «situations in
which a Member State can influence imports or exports through an
undertaking277.» This ability may in particular result from exclusive
rights for import, export, commercialization or production278.
3.3.2. Adjustment or abolition?
As was previously explained, Art. 31 (1) EC requires the adjustment
of State monopolies of a commercial character279. The abolishment of
such monopolies is, in principle, not required280. However, the wording
of Art. 31 (1) EC implies that the obligation to adjust is not met if a
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Member State merely ends its discriminatory behaviour in fact281. What
is required is the elimination of any possibility to discriminate282. If a
monopoly cannot be adjusted in such a way that discrimination is
excluded, it will have to be abolished283.
3.3.3. Is Systembolaget a State monopoly of a commercial
character?
Systembolaget has the exclusive right to carry out the retail sale of
spirits, wine and beer with an alcohol content exceeding 3.5 per cent
by volume284. It has as its object the trade in alcoholic beverages and
plays an effective part in such trade. Systembolaget is therefore the
holder of a monopoly in the legal sense285. This monopoly is a perfect
one since Systembolaget is the only lawful supplier of goods on the
markets for spirits, wine and strong beer286.
Systembolaget is a company fully owned by the Swedish State, to
which the exclusive right to carry out the retail sale of certain goods
has been granted by an authoritative act287. Systembolaget does not
have the right to import or export spirits, wine and strong beer288, but
can, due to its exclusive retail rights, nevertheless influence imports
of alcoholic beverages into Sweden to an appreciable degree289.
Systembolaget therefore constitutes a State monopoly of a
commercial character within the meaning of Art. 31 EC.
3.3.4. The compatibility of Systembolaget’s exclusive rights
with Article 31 EC
When the ECJ in Franzén290 scrutinized the Swedish alcohol
monopoly it came to the conclusion that the exclusive rights granted
to Systembolaget were not contrary to Art. 31 EC. The fact that
products were kept in the basic assortment only if their sales reached
a certain level did, according to the ECJ, not in itself afford an
advantage to domestic products. Neither did the Court find the
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selection procedure and the sales network of Systembolaget or the
rules on the marketing of alcoholic beverages to be discriminative.
That the Court would arrive at the conclusion that the exclusive rights
held by Systembolaget should be compatible with Art. 31 EC was by
no means obvious. Both the previous case-law of the ECJ291 and the
arguments presented in the Opinion by Advocate General Elmer292
had suggested another outcome of the case.
First of all, there are good reasons to argue that marketing
monopolies should be prohibited per se for the same reasons as
import monopolies293. An undertaking which holds a marketing
monopoly, it is argued, can control the import of products just as
effectively as if it held an import monopoly, since it would be
meaningless to import a product which the undertaking refuses to
market294. The same line of argumentation was, albeit unsuccessfully,
used by Advocate General Elmer in the Franzén-case295. In fact, the
ECJ confirmed in La Crespelle296 that even measures which are
applied after the import stage may constitute an obstacle to imports.
Moreover, it declared in Greek Oil Monopoly297 that a State monopoly
on imports could not be distinguished from a monopoly on the refining
of crude oil. In Banchero, finally, the Court upheld an Italian system
which reserved the retail of tobacco products to authorized
distributors for the reason that these distributors, of which there were
76,000, were free to chose the products that they wished to sell298. In
doing so, it can be argued, the Court implicitly stated that a system
which involves the central procurement of products by the sole retail
distributor would infringe not only Art. 28 EC but also Art. 31 EC299.
Why the Court did not follow the same approach in Franzén is not
explained in the judgement.
Even if retail monopolies are not considered to be prohibited per se,
Art. 31 EC can still require the abolishment of individual monopolies
or certain exclusive rights. As was explained above, Art. 31 EC
requires that State monopolies of a commercial character be adjusted
in such a way that any possibility of discrimination is excluded300.
Where such an adjustment is not possible, a monopoly must be
abolished. When a monopoly is scrutinized it must therefore be
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examined whether the national rules leave any room for
discrimination. In Franzén, however, the Court did not carry out such
an examination but merely analyzed whether the rules were applied
in a discriminatory manner301. Had the ECJ asked itself whether the
Swedish rules excluded any possibility for discrimination, its
conclusion might well have been a different one. Even though
Systembolaget is obliged to select its products in a non-
discriminatory way302, it enjoys a large degree of discretion in its
choice. This is particularly true for the initial examination, in which
Systembolaget’s buyers evaluate the price-quality ratio of offers
received and assess previous experience with the production region
and the type of product in question303. Following this examination,
approximately two thirds of the offers are rejected304. Even the blind
test, in which another 90 per cent of the remaining proucts are
eliminated, is by no means objective305. In neither of these tests can
the possibility of discrimination be excluded306.
As was explained above, traders whose offers have been rejected by
Systembolaget can request that the products concerned be sold on
trial307. This, however, does not appear to be a real option. In
November 2001, more than 3,000 products were on the waiting list to
be tested for trial sale, while only 228 products had been tested
between January and mid-November 2001308. Even where
Systembolaget decides to purchase a product or where it is included
in the trial assortment, it is difficult to establish this product on the
Swedish market. In order to be listed in the basic assortment, the
product must reach a certain annual sales volume, which varies for
every product segment309. This can be a rather high threshold
considering that alcoholic beverages may not be directly advertised
to consumers310. These difficulties are reinforced by Systembolaget’s
new assortment policy, which has lead to a considerable decrease of
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products available in the shops311. It is obvious that products that are
shelved in the shops and can be taken home immediately are in a
much better position than those that have to be ordered and picked
up at a later date. Moreover, Systembolaget’s staff apparently tends to
encourage customers to purchase products that are stocked in the
respective shops rather than to order similar products312. These
measures have the cumulative effect of considerably impeding the
successful positioning of new alcoholic beverages on the Swedish
market. This in turn cements the position of already big-selling
products which are well established on the market. Since most of the
best-selling spirits and beers are of Swedish origin313, these measures
must in my view be considered discriminatory in fact.
Another aspect which involves an element of discrimination is the fact
that only traders with a registered office in Sweden are allowed to
submit tenders to Systembolaget314. Even though this rule does not
discriminate against goods but traders from other Member States, it is
in my view incompatible with Art. 31 EC. In that Art. 31 EC prohibits
any discrimination between nationals of Member States, it does not
protect the free movement of goods as such but the traders of other
Member States who participate therein315.
Moreover, the fact that only low-alcoholic beer may be advertised in
periodicals may involve an element of discrimination316. Since beer
may be freely sold in most European countries, breweries in other
Member States will usually only brew beer with an alcohol content
exceeding 3.5 per cent by volume or alcohol-free beer317. Not
surprisingly, the largest part of low-alcoholic beer available in
Swedish shops is of Swedish origin. Even though only low-alcoholic
beer may be advertised in periodicals it is obvious that consumers
will relate such advertisements not only to low-alcoholic beer but also
to ‘strong beer’318. It can therefore not be excluded that this rule
involves at least a possibility of (indirect) discrimination against
products or traders from other Member State319.
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The fact that Swedish products hold a very strong position on the
retail market for alcoholic beverages may be seen as an indication
that the Swedish rules do not only leave room for discrimination but
are also applied in a discriminatory way. During January and
February 2002, six of the ten best sold spirits and eight of the ten best
sold ‘strong beers’ were of Swedish origin320. Moreover, the State-
owned V&S Vin & Sprit AB is still by far the largest provider to
Systembolaget. In the year 2001, V&S Vin & Sprit AB had a market
share of 25.7 per cent in terms of the value of the goods bought by
Systembolaget321. On the other hand, it is clear that the mere fact that
domestic products have a strong market position does not necessarily
imply the existence of discrimination. A preference of domestic
products and conservative buying habits of consumers may be
equally credible explanations322.
3.4. Articles 28 and 30 EC
3.4.1. Preliminary remarks
As was explained above, the ECJ did not examine the existence and
operation of the Swedish retail monopoly for alcoholic beverages
under Art. 28 EC in Franzén323. However, this case has in my view not
changed the case-law of the Court concerning the relationship
between Art. 28 and 31 EC but is to be seen as a case based solely
on its facts and circumstances. In particular, it does not imply in my
opinion that Art. 28 EC can no longer be applied to exclusive rights at
all. The question whether or not the exclusive rights granted to
Systembolaget are compatible with Art. 28 EC may therefore still be
relevant and shall be examined in the following.
3.4.2. Quantitative restrictions and measures having an
equivalent effect
Under Art. 28 EC, «[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all
measures having equivalent effect shall [...] be prohibited between
Member States.» Quantitative restrictions within the meaning of Art.
28 EC are «measures which amount to a total or partial restraint» of
imports324. Measures having equivalent effect to quantitative
restrictions are, according to the well-known Dassonville-formula,
«[a]ll trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of
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hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
Community trade»325.
The potentially very wide field of application of Art. 28 EC was limited
by the ECJ in the Keck-judgement326. The Court drew a distinction
between rules concerning product requirements and rules limiting or
prohibiting certain selling arrangements. While the rules relating to
product requirements continued to fall under Art. 28 EC, the Court
held that Art. 28 EC did not apply «national provisions restricting or
prohibiting certain selling arrangements [...], provided that those
provisions apply to all affected traders operating within the national
territory and provided that they affect in the same manner, in law and
in act, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other
Member States», because such selling arrangements did not hinder
intra-Community trade327 The term ‘certain selling arrangements’ has
been held to cover a prohibition of advertising outside of
pharmacies328, rules on shop opening hours and Sunday trading329,
legislation reserving the sale of baby milk to pharmacies330, the
exclusion of the distribution sector from televised advertising331,
provisions on the sale of products at extremely small profit margins332
and legislation reserving the retail sale of manufactured tobacco
products to authorized distributors333.
While Keck limited the field of application of Art. 28 EC, the earlier
Cassis de Dijon-case334 restricted the interpretation of the
Dassonville-formula by the introduction of a rule of reason335. In this
judgement, the Court held that certain measures, even though within
the Dassonville-formula, were not caught by Art. 28 EC, provided that
there are no common rules and that the national provisions are
indistinctly applicable, necessary in order to meet mandatory
requirements and proportionate to the aim envisaged336. The
judgement mentions the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the
protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions
and the defence of the consumer as examples for mandatory
requirements337. Moreover, Cassis de Dijon established the principle
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of mutual recognition, according to which products that have been
lawfully produced and marketed in one Member State must in
principle be allowed to circulate freely within the common market338.
3.4.3. Are Systembolaget’s exclusive rights a ‘certain selling
arrangement’?
When examining the compatibility of Systembolaget’s exclusive
rights with Art. 28 EC, the first question to ask is whether or not these
exclusive rights fall within the scope of that provision at all. In
particular, it may be argued that the grant of exclusive retail sales
rights to Systembolaget constitutes a ‘certain selling arrangement’
within the meaning of the Keck-judgement339.
As was explained above, the Swedish statutory system on the retail
sale of alcohol must be considered discriminatory in fact since it
precludes traders established in other Member States from offering
their products to Systembolaget and reinforces the strong market
position of domestic products340. Systembolaget’s monopoly does not
therefore constitute a ‘certain selling arrangement’ within the meaning
of the Keck judgement.
Even if the Swedish rules were not found to be discriminatory,
however, they would not escape the application of Art. 28 EC. To my
mind, Keck cannot be interpreted as granting an automatic clearance
to all non-discriminatory selling arrangements. In paras. 16 and 17 of
the judgement, the Court stated that the reason for exempting certain
selling arrangements from the application of Art. 28 EC was because
they were not apt to hinder intra-Community trade. According to
Advocate General Elmer, the Court thereby «merely established that
the purpose of Article [28 EC] is to prohibit obstacles to the free
movement of goods throughout the common market and thereby to
ensure that the products of one Member State have access to the
market in other Member States341.» By using the term ‘certain selling
arrangements’, the Court implied that not all selling arrangements that
do not discriminate against products from other Member States can
escape the prohibition of Art. 28 EC342. Consequently, selling
arrangements that, contrary to the presumption in Keck, do impede
the access of products from other Member States to a national market
and thereby hinder intra-Community trade are still caught by Art. 28
EC, even if they are not discriminatory343. Because Systembolaget
purchases its products centrally and is the only channel through
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which spirits, wine and ‘strong beer’ can be sold to consumers, it is in
a position to decide which of these products shall have access to the
Swedish retail market344. If a product cannot be sold through
Systembolaget, it will not have access to that market at all345. The
Swedish rules therefore impede the access of goods from other
Member States to the Swedish market and thereby hinder intra-
Community trade. They do not therefore constitute a ‘certain selling
arrangement’ within the meaning of Keck and are caught by the
prohibition of Art. 28 EC.
3.4.4. The compatibility of Systembolaget’s exclusive rights
with Article 28 EC
The overriding objective of the Swedish alcohol policy is to limit the
consumption of alcoholic beverages346. The limitation of the
accessibility of such beverages, in particular by the existence and
operation of a retail monopoly, is one of the fundamental features of
this policy347. Consequently, the limitation of alcohol sales is one of
the main purposes of Systembolaget’s monopoly348.
The primary means to limit the accessibility of alcoholic beverages is
the the existence of only a very limited number of points of sale349. As
described above, Systembolaget operates a total of only 417 shops
throughout Sweden, which corresponds to one shop per 1,079 km2
and 21,374 inhabitants350. High prices, restrictions on opening hours351
and the prohibition of selling spirits, wine and ‘strong beer’ to persons
under the age of 20352 limit the accessibility of alcoholic beverages
even further353. As a result of these limitations and other measures,
sales of alcoholic beverages are relatively low in Sweden354.
Moreover, the fact that Systembolaget selects and purchases its
products centrally leads to a substantive limitation of the number of
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alcoholic beverages that are available in the shops. This limitation
has even been reinforced with the introduction of a new selection
procedure355 and the conversion of over-the-counter shops into space
craving self-service shops. An average-sized shop now only stocks
half as many different products as before the introduction of these
measures356. Systembolaget has defended these measures with
arguments of profitability: from an economic point of view, it made
sense only to keep the ‘big sellers’ in the shops357. In an interview with
the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet the head of
Systembolaget’s purchasing department, Barbro Ström, compared
the company’s new policy with that of other retail chains: «All
successful retailers control their assortment centrally. Do you think
that a shop manager at Hennes & Mauritz can decide themselves
what products they want to sell358?» Systembolaget also pointed out
that its overall product range has not been affected by these
measures; all products are still available to order359. These arguments
can, however, not successfully be invoked as a defence for
Systembolaget’s new product policy. While the concentration on ‘big
sellers’ is a legitimate measure on a free market, the situation is
fundamentally different in the case of a monopoly. The refusal of one
retailer to sell a particular product does not have the effect of barring
the access to the market in a situation where there is free competition
while it does have this effect on a monopoly market. As to the
possibility to order off-mainstream products, this can in my view not
be seen to be a real alternative to the availability of such products in
the shops. Products stocked in a shop are much more easily
accessible for customers than products that have to be ordered.
Whenever there are alternative products immediately available in the
shop, customers will generally not bother to order one particular
product and to pick it up at a later date but will choose the
immediately available product instead360.
In my view, each of these measures, the limitation of the points of
sale, the centralization of purchases and Systembolaget’s product
policy, would be sufficient on its own to bring Swedish rules related to
Systembolaget’s monopoly within the Dassonville-formula361. With
respect to the latter two measures, this view has been confirmed by
the ECJ in Banchero362 and in Terminal Equipment.363. In Banchero,
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the Court implicitly suggested that a centralization of the purchases
for the retail market as it is exercised by Systembolaget would be
caught by Art. 28 EC364. In Terminal Equipment, it declared a French
marketing monopoly for telecommunications equipment incompatible
with Art. 28 EC because it found that there was «no certainty that the
holder of the monopoly can offer the entire range of models available
on the market365.» This finding of the Court must be true a fortiori for
alcoholic beverages, where the range of products that can be found
on the market is much wider366.
3.4.5. Justification
Measures which fall within the Dassonville-formula367 can escape the
prohibition of Art. 28 EC if they are justified under the rule of reason
established in Cassis de Dijon368 or the exceptions laid down in Art.
30 EC. While the rule of reason can only be invoked with respect to
indistinctly applicable measures, Art. 30 EC also applies to overtly
discriminating measures369. Since the possibilities of justification
under the rule of reason are wider than those under Art. 30 EC, only
the former will generally have to be applied to indistinctly applicable
measures370.
The Swedish rules on the retail sale of alcoholic beverages govern a
field which is not regulated by Community legislation. They are
indistinctly applicable and have as their objective the protection of
public health. The rule of reason is therefore in principle applicable.
However, they can by no means be considered to be proportionate to
the aim envisaged. If the aim of these rules is to limit the detrimental
effects of the consumption of alcoholic beverages on public health, it
may be questioned whether they are at all appropriate to achieve this
aim. In a recent proposal for an amendment of the legislation on
alcohol, the Swedish government has acknowledged that only half of
the spirits that are consumed in Sweden have been purchased at
Systembolaget or in restaurants371. The share of illegally produced or
sold spirits was deemed to be approximately 35 per cent of the total
consumption of spirits372. These estimations were confirmed in a study
carried out at the Centre for Social Research on Alcohol and Drugs at
Stockholm University in 2002373.
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estimated the total per capita374 consumption of alcohol in 2001 to be
9.2 litres of pure alcohol, which is almost twice the amount of the
official sales figures375. Moreover, a considerable percentage of the
spirits consumed in Sweden are either smuggled or home-distilled376.
The effects of such illegally produced or sold spirits on public health
must be considered to be at least potentially far more injurious than
those of ‘legal’ spirits. Moreover, if the amount of ‘illegal’ spirits is
taken into consideration, the total consumption of spirits in Sweden
would equal or surpass the consumption of alcoholic beverages in
other European countries where they are freely available in grocery
shops377. Even if these measures were considered to be appropriate,
however, they would still not be proportionate because their aim can
be achieved by less restrictive means. In particular, it is not necessary
to reserve the retail sales of alcoholic beverages to a State monopoly
in order to limit the availability of alcoholic beverages and to ensure
that such sales are carried out in a socially responsible manner378. It is
hard to see why the same aim could not be achieved by a licence
system, in which a limited number of privately owned shops would be
authorized to sell alcoholic beverages subject to the same restrictions
that today apply to Systembolaget, but which would be able to
purchase their supplies independently379.
The application of Art. 30 EC to the Swedish rules would not lead to a
different outcome. As every exception, Art. 30 EC is interpreted by the
Court in a narrow manner380. In particular, the Court has held that a
measure can only be justified under Art. 30 EC if it is necessary to
achieve the envisaged aim and proportionate to its purpose381. That
the Swedish rules would not stand such a test of proportionality has
been shown above.
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4. Community Rules on Competition
4.1. General remarks
The ECJ did not apply the Community rules on competition in
Franzén382. This is of course mainly due to the fact that the Swedish
court did not ask for an interpretation of these rules in its reference to
the ECJ383. However, it is clear that the competition rules are in
principle applicable to the activities of Systembolaget. These
activities will therefore be examined hereafter under Art. 82 and 86
EC. Art. 81 EC, which only plays a marginal role in relation to State
monopolies384, will not be considered.
4.2. Articles 82 and 86 EC
Art. 82 EC prohibits the abuse of a dominant position held by one or
more undertakings, insofar as such abuse is liable to have an effect
on intra-Community trade and the dominant position is held in at least
a substantial part of the common market. In principle, any behaviour
that fulfills these criteria is caught by the prohibition in Art. 82 EC; a
de minimis rule does not exist385. The Commission may, however,
refrain from imposing a fine on the infringing undertaking if the
element of abuse or the effect on intra-Community trade are only
minimal386.
Art. 82 EC is addressed to undertakings, not to Member States.
However, the ECJ has defined the concept of an undertaking as «any
entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status
and the way in which it is financed387.» This also encompasses
publicly owned undertakings388. Whenever Member States are
engaged in an economic activity, they are therefore obliged to
observe the prohibition of Art. 82 EC389.
The applicability of Art. 82 EC to activities of Member States also
follows from the general loyalty obligation of the Member States laid
down in Art. 10 EC390. In Inno/ATAB, the Court held that Art. 10 EC in
combination with Art. 3 (g), Art. 81 and Art. 82 EC prevented Member
States from adopting measures that could deprive the competition
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rules of their effet utile391. Where such measures involve the existence
or operation of public or privileged undertakings, this principle is
specified in Art. 86 EC392. Art. 86 (1) prohibits Member States from
enacting or maintaining in force any measure related to such
undertakings which is contrary to the Treaty rules, particularly to Art.
12 and 81 to 89 EC. This prohibition applies to all acts that prescribe,
favour or make inevitable anti-competitive behaviour of undertakings
or delegate the power to adopt such acts to private bodies393. The form
in which these acts have been adopted is irrelevant; what matters is
whether their function is «to regulate the market place from the
perspective of the public interest»394. Art. 86 (2) EC contains a
(relatively narrow) exemption for services of general economic
interest and revenue-producing monopolies395. Art. 86 (3) EC finally
lays down procedural rules for the application of Art. 86 (1) and (2)
EC396.
4.3. The compatibility of Systembolaget’s exclusive rights
with Articles 82 and 86 EC
In order for a Member State to infringe Art. 86 (1) in conjunction with
Art. 82, two main conditions must be met397: Firstly, there must be an
abuse of a dominant position by an undertaking398. Secondly, the
undertaking in question must be a public or privileged one and the
abuse must have been prescribed, favoured or made inevitable by a
measure enacted or maintained by the Member State or made
possible through a delegation of powers to a private body by that
State399.
4.3.1. Dominant position
Systembolaget is constituted as a limited company and thereby
clearly qualifies as an entity400. It is engaged in the retail trade in
alcoholic beverages and thereby pursues an economic activity401.
Systembolaget therefore constitutes an undertaking within the
definition of the ECJ402.
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Dominance has been defined by the ECJ as «a position of economic
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by
giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently
of its competitors, customers and ultimately of consumers403.» In
determining whether an undertaking holds a dominant position, it is
therefore necessary to identify the relevant market and to assess the
undertaking’s position on that market404.
The main criterion when establishing the relevant product market is
interchangeability or substitutability405. Whether two products are
interchangeable is to be determined from the view of the customers
and with respect to the products’ characteristics, prices and intended
use406. This is usually done by applying a so-called cross-elasticity
test: If products A and B are intended for the same use and a
permanent price increase of 5-10 per cent for product A would induce
a significant percentage of consumers to shift to product B, the
products are presumed to be interchangeable407.
Alcoholic beverages are sold to consumers through two different
channels: retail trade in shops on the one hand and sales in
restaurants and bars (‘serving‘) on the other. The reasons for which
alcoholic beverages are purchased differ considerably between these
two ways of sale408. It is unlikely that a small increase of the prices for
alcoholic beverages in shops would induce many consumers to buy
these beverages in restaurants and bars instead. The retail market for
alcoholic beverages sold in shops is therefore separate from the one
for alcoholic beverages served in restaurants and bars. With regard to
the Swedish alcohol monopoly, only the former is of interest.
The retail market for alcoholic beverages sold in shops must in turn
be divided into several different product markets. Spirits must in my
view clearly be considered not to be substitutable by other goods and
are therefore not part of the same market as other alcoholic
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beverages. As to beer and wine, it may be noted that the ECJ has
stated on several occasions that the existence of a competitive
relationship between these two product categories cannot be
excluded409. Moreover, in recent cases concerning the Norwegian
retail monopoly for alcohol the EFTA court has affirmed that a
competitive relationship between wine in its lightest and cheapest
varieties, medium-strength beer and so-called alcopops existed to a
sufficient extent in order for Art. 16 EEA (which corresponds to Art. 31
EC) to apply410. The existence of a certain competitive relationship
between two products does, however, not necessarily imply the
interchangeability of these products. In order for Art. 16 EEA to apply,
it is sufficient that two products are «to some extent capable of
meeting the same consumer needs»411. A merely limited
interchangeability of products is, however, not sufficient for two
products to be part of the same product market412. If the cross-elasticity
test413 is applied, the question whether light wine, medium-strength
beer and alcopops are interchangeable must be answered in the
negative. It may be true that these beverages are to a certain degree
purchased and consumed for the same purposes. Considering the
significant differences in taste between any two of these product
categories, however, I find it highly unlikely that many consumers
would, for example, shift to beer or alcopops if the prices for light wine
were raised by 5-10 per cent. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that
the ECJ tends to define the relevant product market in a very narrow
way414. Accordingly, wine, even of the lightest and cheapest varieties,
beer and alcopops cannot be considered to form part of the same
product market. For the same reasons, there is in my view no
interchangeability of low-alcoholic beer415 and ‘strong beer’416.
With respect to alcoholic beverages sold in shops by way of retail, at
least five different relevant product markets can be identified:
· spirits;
· wine;
· alcopops;
· beer with an alcohol content of more than 3.5 per cent by volume;
and
· beer with an alcohol content of up to 3.5 per cent by volume.
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Since all products that form part of the first four markets may be sold
by retail only by Systembolaget, there is no need to examine whether
these markets can be further narrowed down in order to determine
whether Systembolaget holds a dominant position on these markets.
The relevant geographical market is defined as the area «in which
the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which
can be distinguished from neighbouring areas because the
conditions of competition are appreciably different in those areas417.»
Systembolaget has a monopoly for the retail sale of spirits, wine and
‘strong beer’ within the territory of Sweden. The structure of
competition within that territory is therefore homogeneous. Norway
and Finland have reserved the retail sale of the aforesaid products to
other monopoly undertakings418, while no such monopoly exists in
Denmark. The relevant geographical market is therefore identical with
the territory of Sweden.
As a statutory monopoly for the retail sale of spirits, wine and ‘strong
beer’, Systembolaget holds by definition a dominant position on the
relevant market as defined above419. The ECJ has held on numerous
occasions that the area of one Member State will generally constitute
a substantial part of the common market within the meaning of Art. 82
EC420. Systembolaget must therefore be held to have a dominant
position on the markets for spirits, wine and ‘strong beer’ within a
substantial part of the common market.
4.3.2. Abuse
The existence of a dominant position does not in itself infringe Art. 82
EC421. It is only if a dominant position is abused that the prohibition in
Art. 82 EC will apply422. The concept of abuse is not defined in Art. 82
EC; however, para. 2 of the Article contains a non-exhaustive list of
behaviours which are considered abusive. With respect to
monopolies, Art. 82, para. 2 (b) EC has been of particular relevance
in the case-law of the Court423. This provision gives the limitation of
«production, markets or technical development to the detriment of
consumers» as an example of an abusive behaviour.
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In Höfner424, the Court had to determine whether a German statutory
monopoly for employment procurement was compatible with Art. 82
EC. The monopoly undertaking had been unable to meet the demand
for services related to the recruitment of executives425. Even though
the undertaking was found to have endeavoured to the best of its
ability426, the Court held that its manifest failure «to satisfy the demand
prevailing on the market» constituted a limitation of services and
therefore an abuse of a dominant position427. Accordingly, State
monopolies must be organized so as to ensure that they are in a
position to meet the demand for their products or services428. This
principle was further developed in Merci, where the Court held that a
monopoly undertaking was abusing its dominant position by failing to
use modern technology for the provision of its services429. This seems
to imply that a monopoly undertaking must not only satisfy the
demand but perform its activities in such a way that the quality of the
products or services in question meets the legitimate expectations of
its customers430.
The main overriding objective of the Swedish alcohol monopoly is the
limitation of the consumption of alcoholic beverages431. The existence
of only a small number of points of sale has together with other factors
led to a considerable limitation of the accessibility and thereby to a
relatively low level of sales of alcoholic beverages in Sweden432. This
low level of sales does, however, not necessarily imply an equally
low demand. A monopoly undertaking is in a position to act largely
independently of the needs of its consumers433. Sales and demand do
therefore not necessarily correlate on a monopolized market. In the
case of the Swedish retail monopoly for alcoholic beverages, there is
in fact evidence to support the assumption that the actual demand for
alcoholic beverages is considerably higher than Systembolaget’s
sales. First of all, the fact that the Swedish government repeatedly
stresses the connection between a limited accessibility and a low
level of sales leads to the natural presumption that the level of sales
would be higher if alcoholic beverages were more easily
accessible434. The fact that the sales of alcoholic beverages are only
about half as high in Sweden as in Denmark also supports this
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presumption435. Finally, the Swedish government estimates that only
50 per cent of the spirits consumed in Sweden are actually purchased
through Systembolaget or restaurants; the remaining half is either
produced or sold illegally or imported from other countries436.
To my mind, these facts clearly show that Systembolaget only
partially satisfies the demand for alcoholic beverages in Sweden.
Moreover, it could be argued that the quality of Systembolaget’s
assortment does not meet the legitimate expectations of its customers
due to the fact that only a very limited number of big-selling products
is available in smaller shops. Accordingly, Systembolaget is not in a
position to meet the demand for alcoholic beverages and therefore
abuses its dominant position by limiting its services.
4.3.3. Effect on trade between Member States
An abuse of a dominant position is considered to affect intra-
Community trade if it is liable to have an influence on the pattern of
trade in goods or services between Member States437. Neither does
this influence have to be a harmful or negative one nor is it necessary
to establish that intra-Community trade is actually affected; a potential
effect is sufficient438. As was shown above, the fact that Systembolaget
only operates a very limited number of points of sale leads to a
reduction of the sales of alcoholic beverages in Sweden. If the
number of the shops corresponded to the actual demand, these sales
are likely to be considerably higher. Consequently, suppliers of
alcoholic beverages from other Member States would be able to sell
more of their products on the Swedish market. The limitation of its
services by Systembolaget therefore has an actual and direct effect
on trade between Member States.
4.3.4. Public undertaking
Under Commission Directive 80/723/EEC on the transparency of
financial relations between Member States and public undertakings,
the term ‘public undertaking’ is defined as encompassing «[a]ny
undertaking over which the public authorities may exercise directly or
indirectly a dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of it, their
financial participation therein or the rules which govern it439.» Even
though this definition is only valid for the field of application of the
transparency regulation, it can at least serve as a guideline for the
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interpretation of the term ‘public undertaking’ within the meaning of
Art. 86 (1) EC440.
In that the Swedish States fully owns Systembolaget and controls its
activities both by virtue of its ownership and of legal provisions,
Systembolaget is a public undertaking within the meaning of Art. 86
(1) EC.
4.3.5. Measure contrary to the Treaty rules
As was explained above, the measures prohibited by Art. 86 (1) EC
include all acts that prescribe, favour or make inevitable anti-
competitive behaviour of undertakings or delegate the power to adopt
such acts to private bodies441. In Höfner, the Court held that a Member
State is in breach of Art. 86 (1) if, by the grant of an exclusive right, it
has created a situation where the undertaking in question cannot
avoid abusing its dominant position, merely by exercising its
exclusive right442. This was held to be the case where a Member State
reserves an activity to an undertaking which is not in a position to
satisfy the demand prevailing on the market443.
Systembolaget is unable to meet the demand for alcoholic
beverages. First of all, it must be remembered that the main reason
for the existence of Systembolaget is the desire of the Swedish
government to limit the sales of alcoholic beverages444. The
compliance with this desire is ensured by the 100 per cent ownership
of Systembolaget by the Swedish State. The full satisfaction of
(quantitative) consumer demand can therefore not even be one of
Systembolaget’s aims. Even if it were, however, it would hardly be
possible for one single undertaking to set up a sufficiently large
network of shops to meet the quantitative demand for alcoholic
beverages. Not only would such a project require enormous
resources as to both staff and finances, but also is it necessary to
consult the parish council and the police authority before the
establishment of every shop; the opening of a new shop is therefore
also a highly political question445.
Systembolaget is therefore in a position where, merely by exercising
its exclusive right, it cannot avoid abusing its dominant position. The
Swedish State has created this situation by the grant of the exclusive
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right and the imposition of restrictive rules on Systembolaget’s
operation and has thereby breached Art. 86 (1) EC.
4.3.6. Justification
A measure that falls within the prohibition of Art. 86 (1) EC may be
exempted under Art. 86 (2) EC for reasons of public interest. The
possibility of exemption applies to undertakings entrusted with the
operation of services of general economic interest and to revenue-
producing monopolies, but only insofar as the application of
Community law would obstruct the performance of the tasks of such
undertakings446. Moreover, the operation of such undertakings must
not affect the development of trade to such an extent that it would be
contrary to Community interests447.
The Court has so far avoided to provide a general definition of the
concept of services of a general economic interest448. Clearly the
concept encompasses economic activities whose operation is in the
interest of the general public449. Moreover, it is generally agreed upon
that it is not limited to services within the meaning of Art. 49 EC but
also includes the production and distribution of goods450. As to the
question of what services are to be regarded as being of a general
interest, the Court has held that the interpretation of this term is not left
to the Member States451. Services that have been considered to be of
a general interest by the Court or the Commission include public
utility undertakings such as water authorities452, post monopolies453,
energy undertakings454 and employment procurement monopolies455.
On the other hand, the Court has denied the existence of a general
interest with respect to a monopoly for the trade in
telecommunications equipment456 and to a monopoly for the operation
of harbours457. In the light of this case-law, it appears that the Court is
only willing to accept the existence of a general interest where the
general public has a direct benefit from the activities in question in
that these activities ensure the supply of essential goods or
services458. A typical example for this would be the operation of a post
monopoly which is obliged to deliver mail at a standard rate within the
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entire territory of a State, even if such deliveries may in certain cases
be uneconomic459.
Art. 86 (2) EC is also applicable to undertakings that have the
character of a revenue-producing monopoly. A monopoly is revenue-
producing if its purpose is to secure a specific source of income for
the State (mission fiscale)460. An obligation to transfer its profits to the
State is not sufficient461. It is only where the exclusive right has been
granted solely for fiscal reasons that an undertaking will be
considered a revenue-producing monopoly462.
To my mind, Systembolaget does not fall within either of these two
categories of undertakings. Since its main purpose is not the
generation of revenues but the limitation of the sales of alcoholic
beverages, it does not have the character of a revenue-producing
monopoly. Systembolaget is not entrusted with the operation of a
service of general interest either. Alcoholic beverages cannot be
objectively qualified as goods which are essential to the general
public. Moreover, the overriding purpose of Systembolaget is not the
best possible supply of alcoholic beverages (which could probably be
done more effectively by a multitude of competing undertakings), but
on the contrary the limitation of such supply.
The grant of the exclusive right to carry out retail sales of alcoholic
beverages to Systembolaget by the Swedish State cannot therefore
escape the prohibition of Art. 86 (1) EC.
                                                
459 Case C-320/91, para. 15.
460 HEINEMANN, pp. 180-181; IMMENGA/MESTMÄCKER, pp. 1588-1589; SAVIA, p.
232.
461 HEINEMANN, p. 181; SAVIA, p. 232.
462 HEINEMANN, p. 181; SAVIA, p. 233; IMMENGA/MESTMÄCKER, p. 1589.
60
V. The Swedish Alcohol
Policy - Possible Alterna-
tives
1. The Current Swedish Policy on Alcohol
Sweden has traditionally pursued a restrictive policy on alcohol463.
The current policy is based on a balance between high taxation,
restrictions, information and opinion-forming as well as treatment464.
The overriding aim of this policy is to limit the total consumption of
alcohol and thereby to reduce alcohol abuse and the harmful effects
connected therewith465. The retail monopoly for alcoholic beverages
exercised by Systembolaget is one of the centrepieces of this
policy466. The existence of only a very limited number of shops leads
to a considerable limitation of the availability and, eventually, to a
reduction of the consumption of alcoholic beverages467.
At first sight, this policy appears to be fairly successful. In 1976, the
year before the current policy was introduced, the per capita468 sale of
alcoholic beverages was 7.7 litres of pure alcohol469 - by 2001 sales
were down to 4.9 litres per capita, which is considerably below the
figures of most other western European countries470. Moreover,
Sweden has a relatively low mortality from alcohol-related diseases
such as liver cirrhosis471. A closer analysis, however, sheds a
somewhat different light on the effectiveness of the Swedish alcohol
policy. A study carried out by researchers at the Centre for Social
Research on Alcohol and Drugs (SoRAD) at Stockholm University
estimated the total per capita472 consumption of alcohol in 2001 to be
9.2 litres of pure alcohol, which is almost twice the amount of the
official sales figures473. Moreover, a considerable percentage of the
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spirits consumed in Sweden are either smuggled or home-distilled474.
Apart from large consumers, such smuggled or home-distilled spirits
appear to be particularly popular with adolescents, a group whose
protection is one of the main goals of the Swedish policy475. In a
survey from 1998, more than 50% of high school students in
theoretical programmes and more than 70% of those in practical
programmes stated that they had purchased or been invited to drink
home-distilled spirits within the previous twelve months476.
Critics of the Swedish alcohol policy also raise doubts as to whether
the accessibility and the total consumption of alcohol are really as
closely connected as asserted by the Swedish government. In
Québec, Ontario and New Zealand a drastic increase in the
accessibility of alcoholic beverages had little or no effect on the total
consumption, nor has the treplication of licenced restaurants in
Sweden since 1980477. Moreover, the consumption of alcohol in
Mediterranean countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain has
decreased by 30 to 40 per cent between 1980 and the late 1990s,
even though the accessibility of alcoholic beverages remained
unaltered478. Critics also maintain that there is little connection
between the level of prices and the overall consumption. A high level
of prices, they maintain, either results in a high unregistered
consumption (i.e. imported, smuggled or home-made beverages) 479 or
would merely induce consumers to switch to other, i.e. cheaper
products480. Defenders of the high-pricing policy on the other hand
assert that the number of alcohol-related diseases would not have
decreased to the same extent if the high price levels had not lead to a
reduction of the total consumption481.
2. Possible alternatives
2.1. General Remarks
With its accession to the European Union on January 1, 1995,
Sweden has become part of an integrated market. By 2004, Sweden
will have to raise its limits for the personal importation of alcoholic
beverages to EU standards, which means that up to 10 litres of spirits,
20 litres of intermediate products, 90 litres of wine and 110 litres of
beer may be freely imported into Sweden from other Member
                                                
474 LEIFMAN/TROLLDAL, p. 13.
475 Proposition 1998/99:134, p. 131.
476 Proposition 1998/99:134, p. 50.
477 Proposition 1998/99:134, p. 33.
478 Ibidem.
479 Proposition 1998/99:134, p. 36.
480 ERIKSSON, p. 48.
481 Proposition 1998/99:134, p. 36.
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States482. Moreover, the mobility of the Swedish population has
dramatically increased over the past decades. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, there are serious doubts as to the compatibility of
the Swedish alcohol policy with Community law. For these reasons it
has become increasingly difficult for Sweden to maintain its restrictive
policy on alcohol, which in many respects stands isolated within the
European Union, with the exception of Finland483. In view of the
continuing process of European integration and the ever-increasing
mobility, external factors will have an even bigger influence on the
alcohol consumption and drinking habits of Swedes in the future. It is
therefore necessary to look for possible alternatives to the current
Swedish alcohol policy which take these external factors into
account.
2.2. Necessity of State intervention
First of all, it may of course be asked whether the State should at all
have the duty or even the right to protect self-responsible individuals
from their own acts. If an individual choses to consume alcohol,
tobacco or drugs, to take on excessive workloads or to sign
overreaching contracts, is not this a decision that he should be
allowed to make without the interference of the State? From a liberal
point of view, the State should only limit the private autonomy of
individuals where it is absolutely required. Insofar as an individual by
his actions causes damage only to himself, it should not therefore be
the duty of the State to protect him from the consequences of his own
acts. However, it is important to remember that actions of individuals
often have an effect not only on themselves but also on other people.
The self-intoxication of a family father may cause greater harm to his
wife and children than to himself. Moreover, the principle of private
autonomy must clearly be limited with respect to individuals with only
a limited ability to make self-responsible decisions. The protection of
children, mentally handicapped people and people in need is one of
the most important tasks of any social society.
The total absence of State activity in fields such as alcohol can
therefore not be a practicable solution. While the State should not
interfere with decisions of self-responsible individuals where such
decisions only affect themselves, it must provide mechanisms to
prevent adverse effects of such decisions on other people and to
protect individuals who are in need of protection. Furthermore, it
should help people to re-integrate into our society who are incapable
of doing so out of their own forces, even if they have caused their
distress by their own fault.
                                                
482 S. supra, III. 4.2.
483 Proposition 1998/99:135, p. 83.
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2.3. Abolishment of the monopoly
Apart from the complete absence of State intervention, a far-reaching
liberalisation of the retail market for alcoholic beverages would be the
most radical alternative to the current solution. The role of the State
would be limited to preventive and re-integrative work, the protection
of children and people in need, treatment and the setting up of a legal
framework for the retailing of alcoholic beverages (age limits,
marketing, sanitary requirements, etc.). Moreover, the State could still
exercise a considerable amount of control over the prices for
alcoholic beverages by means of taxation. Such a solution would not
only be in line with EC law but also improve the supply of alcoholic
beverages and the selection of products. Even off-mainstream
products that would never find their way onto the shelves of
Systembolaget, such as outstanding wines and rare single malts,
could be established in niche-markets. On the other hand, the
foreseeable dramatic improvement of accessibility is likely to lead to
a certain increase of the total consumption of alcohol. In my view,
however, it may be doubted whether this increase would be
significant on the long run. In the last twenty years the number of
licenced restaurants and bars in Sweden has increased by 200 per
cent while the consumption of alcohol has remained stable484. Similar
experiences have been made with the liberalisation of markets in
other countries485.
However, such a far-reaching solution would in all likelyhood not find
a majority in the Swedish Parliament. Any attempts to liberalise the
Swedish alcohol legislation have been highly disputed in the past.
Even very moderate changes such as the extension of
Systembolaget’s opening hours or the possibility to pay alcoholic
beverages with credit cards have been intensely debated486. A less
radical alternative would therefore be to set up a system of
independent outlets, which would have to obtain a licence from the
State and would be subject to the same restrictions as Systembolaget
is today487. Such a system would enable the State to control the
accessibility of alcohol through the grant of licences, but still bring
about a considerable improvement on the selection and supply side.
Since these outlets would all be able to select their products
independently, this system would not entail any particular obstacles
to the free movement of goods488. It would also be compatible with the
Community rules on competition since the products would be
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purchased and distributed not by a single operator but a multitude of
independent undertakings.
2.4. Transformation of the monopoly
An even less far-reaching solution would be to maintain the retail
monopoly, but to allow each of the shops to obtain their supplies
independently. Popular products could still be purchased centrally in
order to obtain better conditions, but shop managers would be free to
decide which products they want to purchase. This solution would
eliminate the existing conflicts with the Community rules on the free
movement of goods. Moreover, it would bring a certain element of
competition into the retail market for alcoholic beverages, even
though the shops would still be operated by a single undertaking.
However, if Systembolaget should be able to satisfy the demand of
consumers (and thus to avoid abusing its dominant position), it would
have to increase the number of its outlets dramatically. It may be
doubted whether one single undertaking would be able to set up a
sufficient number of outlets in a reasonably short period of time: while
low-alcoholic beer can be bought in approximately 14,000 shops,
other alcoholic beverages are only available in Systembolaget’s 417
stores489. This solution would therefore in all likelyhood not be
compatible with the competition rules of the Treaty.
2.5. Promotion of wine and beer
A number of scientific studies support the assumption that wine and
beer are much less harmful to health than spirits. In fact, a Danish
study referred to in Advocate General Elmer’s Opinion in the Franzén
case came to the conclusion that a normal consumption of wine and
beer did not have any adverse effects on health490. A light to moderate
consumption of wine was even found to significantly reduce the risk
of dying from all causes491. The consumption of spirits, on the other
hand, was found to increase the risk of death considerably492. In
addition to the measures suggested above, it would therefore be
obvious to encourage consumers to drink wine and beer instead of
spirits. This would also be in line with the aims of the Swedish
alcohol policy493.
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A shift from spirits to wine and beer could in particular be achieved by
lowering the taxes on wine and beer while maintaining a high level of
taxation for spirits. The price has been shown to be one of the
decisive factors for the choice of alcoholic beverages: a high price for
spirits will result in an increased consumption of wine and beer and a
reduction of the consumption of spirits494. A further significant raise of
the taxes on spirits on the other hand, could in my view be
counterproductive, at least if the taxes on wine and beer were to
remain on the same level, since this would lead to an increased
consumption of smuggled or home-distilled alcohol495. Information
campaigns and wine tastings could be an additional valuable tool to
encourage consumers to change their drinking habits.
2.6. Building up an alcohol culture
The drinking habits of many Swedish consumers differ considerably
from those in other countries. Especially in wine-drinking cultures
such as the Mediterranean countries, alcohol tends to be consumed
in order to enjoy its taste. Moreover, it is rather usual in many
countries to consume alcohol on a regular basis, but in moderate
amounts, e.g. to drink a glass of wine for lunch or dinner every day.
Swedes in contrast typically only consume alcohol once or twice a
week, but often to the degree of intoxication496. The main cause to
drink is often not enjoyment but the intoxicating effect of alcoholic
beverages.
One of the reason behind this drinking pattern might be the general
notion prevailing in the Swedish society that the consumption of
alcohol is per se a bad thing. Alcoholic beverages are generally
rather associated with intoxication than with enjoyment and savoir
vivre. The Swedish alcohol policy has not precisely contributed to a
change of this view. The absence of any element of sensuality in
Systembolaget’s shops (the old over-the-counter shops have the
atmosphere of pharmacies) even adds to the feeling that any alcohol
consumption is inevitably an injurious act. Moreover,
Systembolaget’s new product policy, which has lead to a
concentration on big-selling products, has done little to encourage its
customers to consume products of a higher quality instead of mass
goods. Amongst the products that have particularly been affected by
this policy are quality wines. Of the 377 red wines that were available
in the medium-sized shop at Kyrkgatan 92 in Östersund on April 4,
2002, only 37 were bottled wines in the price category over SEK
100.00497. The share of white wines in this category was even lower,
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with only 11 out of 254 being bottled wines being priced over SEK
100.00498. Of the ten best selling wines in April 2002, none was even
priced over SEK 60.00499. Moreover, all of them were available in so-
called bag-in-box packages of three or even ten litres, which is not
precisely an indication for outstanding quality.
In my view, the Swedish alcohol policy should aim at creating a more
positive general notion of a light to moderate consumption of alcohol.
Products which are generally not consumed for their intoxicating
effect but for their taste, such as quality wines, should be associated
with sensuality and lifestyle rather than intoxication. ‘Drink to enjoy,
not to get drunk’ should be the message. If combined with information
campaigns, a liberalisation of the retail market could in some ways
contribute to a change of the Swedish drinking habits. In particular, it
would allow the establishment of shops specialized in quality
products, in which consumers would be able to choose and taste
wine and other products in an atmosphere of savoir vivre and with the
help of informed staff. Such shops exist in many European cities
outside of Sweden. Other measures such as wine tastings could
further help to improve the Swedes’ knowledge about alcoholic
beverages and induce them to drink more quality and less quantity.
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VI. Conclusion
The compatibility of the Swedish alcohol monopoly remains a
controversial issue. Even through the legality of the Swedish statutory
rules was upheld by the ECJ in its Franzén judgement, the monopoly
does not stand immune against further legal action. Firstly, Franzén
must in my view be seen as a decision based solely on its particular
facts. Not only did the Court deviate from its previous case-law
regarding the applicability of Art. 28 EC on State monopolies of a
commercial character without expressly stating so but also did the
Court’s approach differ fundamentally from the one it chose in the
Energy Monopoly judgements, which were handed down on the very
same day. Secondly, Franzén only dealt with questions regarding the
free movement of goods. In particular, the Court did not make any
statement as to the monopoly’s compatibility with competition law.
Thirdly, Systembolaget’s new product policy, which has lead to a
considerable reduction of products available in the monopoly’s
shops, has significantly changed the factual circumstances on which
Franzén was based.
In my view, Systembolaget’s monopoly is contrary to EC law for the
following reasons:
· By being the only lawful retailer of alcoholic beverages in Sweden,
Systembolaget can in practice control the importation of such
products just as effectively as an undertaking holding a (per se
prohibited) import monopoly.
· Art. 31 EC requires the adjustment of monopolies in such a way
that any possibility of discrimination is excluded. Contrary to this
requirement, Systembolaget’s selection criteria are highly
discretionary. Moreover, traders established in other Member
States are precluded from offering their products to Systembolaget.
· Systembolaget’s product policy sets high hurdles for the
establishment of new products on the market. The market position
of already well-known products, many of which are Swedish, is
thereby reinforced.
· The Swedish rules have both the aim and the effect to limit the sale
of alcoholic beverages, in particular by limiting the number of
points of sale. They must therefore be considered measures of an
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions within the meaning of
Art. 28 EC. In that they are discriminatory in fact and hinder the
access of products from other Member States to the Swedish
market, these rules do not constitute a ‘certain selling
arrangement’. They cannot be justified under the rule of reason or
under Art. 30 EC because their aims can be achieved by far less
restrictive means.
68
· Systembolaget is not able to satisfy the quantitative and qualitative
demand for alcoholic beverages in Sweden, nor is it
Systembolaget’s aim to do so. The Swedish rules leave
Systembolaget in a situation where it cannot avoid infringing its
dominant position. Systembolaget can neither be qualified as an
undertaking entrusted with the operation of services of general
economic interest nor as a revenue-producing monopoly. The
exception of Art. 86 (2) EC does therefore not apply.
The incompatibility of Systembolaget’s monopoly with EC law along
with the increasing influence of other external factors suggests the
need for a change of the Swedish policy on alcohol. The retail market
for alcoholic beverages must therefore be liberalised, either by
allowing such beverages to be freely sold or by introducing a system
of independent licenced shops. Moreover, efforts should be made to
change the drinking habits of the Swedish population. Consumers
should be taught to appreciate quality products and to consume them
for their taste, not their effect.
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